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CHAPTER 1. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
1. INTRODUCTION.
Budo is a Japanese word comprising two Chinese ideographs meaning “Martial”
and “Way.” The nuance of the word-phrase implies that studying martial arts is a way of
life, a calling similar to that of one who enters religious life. However, budo is more than
just a compilation of combat techniques, and is more than living a life studying combat
techniques. Budo, in addition to its technical aspect, is a method of cultivating the “Self”
through severe training.
In this modern age it is possible to write of budo without having to go into great
detail about its combat efficacy: it is a truism that Japanese budo is recognized worldwide
as an effective combative. As early as 1917 Frank Tiebout related that budo, in the form
of jujutsu, was taught to soldiers of the US Army in preparation for their anticipated
hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. “The authorities apparently thought we might have
to do a little wrestling with the Boche, so they opened up a course in jiu-jitsu. Peculiar
methods of choking and resuscitation seemed to be the Jap’s chief stock in trade”
(Tiebout, ca. 1917:21). Indeed, budo has been adapted by the military forces and civil
police of countries around the globe. However, the western world has not always
understood budo’s “prime directive;” that is, as a means of developing individual
character and self-cultivation through austere training. This misunderstanding of budo’s
more elevated ideal influenced US authorities to dissolve the Japanese martial arts
control organ, the Dai Nippon Butokukai, in 1946 (US Government, 1948).
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2. THESIS.
The thesis of this paper is that budo—Japanese martial arts—were used by the
Government of Japan as well as the US Government to formulate national policy. The
intrinsic aspects of the budo were utilized by the Japanese Government to mold its
citizenry into a militaristic society so that, “by 1941 Japan was sufficiently mobilized to
begin an aggressive war” (Draeger, 1996c:47). Governmental exploitation and
“corruption” (Tanaka 1966) of the inherent concept of bushido (the “Way of the
Samurai”) as taught in the public schools and military academies, created a culture of the
supreme sacrifice (Morimoto, 1992:148-151; Rosenberg, 1995:15; Russell, 1958; Sasaki,
1995; Tanaka, 1996:206). Conversely, the US Government is widely believed to have
instituted a ban on the practice of all martial arts after Japan capitulated (Davey, 1997;
Draeger 1996c; Harries 1978; Harrison 1958; Hassell 1983; Horsely and Buckley 1990;
JMAS 1984; Kiyota 1977; Onoda 1974; Reid and Croucher 1983; Stevens 1978; US
Government 1948) in a policy move supposedly made to “democratize” the Japanese .
However, research shows that there was not a universal “Budo Ban;” at least, it is not
recorded as such. Later chapters will further expound on the “non-ban budo ban.”
3. METHODOLOGY.
My research was conducted via a literature review of pertinent Japanese and US
governmental documents, doctoral dissertations, unpublished papers, journals, historical
books, and trade books. Additionally, I conducted a series of interviews with two leading
exponents of budo who were in Japan during the time in review, as well as others who
were present during the time in review.
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In looking at my subject, I divide the areas of interest into two spheres: Japan, and
America. On the Japanese side I briefly map the transition of martial arts from individual
fighting to the establishment of private “schools” of tradition (ryu-ha) such as the Muso
Jikiden Eishin Ryu style of swordsmanship; to the formation of a national standard
overseen by private individuals—embodied in the Butokukai organization; and
eventually to the broad government control disseminated through the public education
system via the Monbusho (Ministry of Education) and military training academies such
as the Toyama Military Academy and the Army Officers Academy.
Of major import is the Japanese Government’s redefinition of classical bushido,
the “warrior’s code,” into what has been called “corrupted bushido” (Tanaka 1996) of the
Second World War. I believe this “corrupted bushido” bore major responsibility for the
US Government’s severe view of “martial arts.”
On the US side, I begin at the post-war Occupation era of 1945 - 1950 when the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) allegedly established a policy
banning martial arts as an adjunct to initiating the demilitarization and democratization of
Japan. A review of the literature shows variances in the description of this so-called ban.
Some writers state there was a total blackout, others indicate the ban affected only a
certain population. Still, other chroniclers state there was no ban at all on martial arts,
that the proscription was to be applied only to “modern warfare” training. Although
there is a dearth of resources for the Japanese sphere, the US portion of this research
paper suffers from a lack of information, due in part to the relatively short time period in
review.
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Information about the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was corollary to
building and supporting my thesis. I originally planned to include information about the
JSDF in an attempt to discover how strong a military force they represent, and whether or
not the demilitarization process was too deeply inculcated. In other words, the question
was begged, “can the modern Japanese warriors—bereft of the benefit of state
propaganda—fare as well on the field of battle as did their fathers, uncles, and
grandfathers?” However, the corollary proved too significant an area of study to include
here only as a sidebar. In-depth research into the “JSDF v. Japanese Society” as a solesubject research project is worthy of future study.

CHAPTER 2. THE JAPAN SIDE
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
The organization and instruction of martial arts of today differs greatly than days
gone by. Today we see groups of people in brightly lighted studios practicing armed and
unarmed “fighting techniques” as sport, past time, or avocation by people who are not
engaged in the military or police professions. Reasons for studying modern budo are
many and varied, but most people attribute training in the budo as a way to maintain
health, exorcise the soul, or to become self-confident. A far cry from 600 years ago when
the martial arts were learned so one could stay alive on the battlefield.
a. Beginnings of the Ryu-Ha (Traditional Schools).
Except for the bushi (knight warriors), the majority of combatants prior to the
Muromachi era (1338 - 1573) went to battle with little training in arms. These light
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infantry, the ashigaru, received on-the-job training usually in spearmanship since the
spear of that day was a long-range weapon which required little knowledge—one just
held it forward angled toward the opposing forces’ cavalry or light infantry. Ashigaru
were drawn from the ranks of the peasantry, and although they may have been able to
swing a sword in place of a hoe, they were not samurai. Nonetheless, because of the
long-term struggle for power throughout early Japan, the farmer-soldier eventually
became established into the lowest rank of the warrior caste. Now separated from the
farming profession, the ashigaru eventually evolved into the goshi, or lower-class
samurai, who now required training in combat arts. It was during this time that schools
of traditional budo began to evolve.
The constant subversion and warfare of the Muromachi period led the bushi to
progressively ignore their noble ideals and battlefield ethic although it stimulated the
development of many new aspects of military skill. The values of the classical bushi
almost disappeared completely (Boyet, 1983:1). According to Ellis Amdur, an historian
as well as practitioner of koryu (ancient tradition) budo, it was during
this uncertain time, a few individuals desiring to preserve the old values,
to improve their combat effectiveness, and to have a positive effect on
their society created the first schools of martial traditions (ryu-ha). They
attempted to restore the old sense of group identity and loyalty which
originally motivated the classical warriors. Instead of a clan centered
around the family network, each ryu-ha gathered itself around a discrete
system of combat to support a social group.…Each ryu-ha was usually the
product of one individual’s spiritual insight. This “spiritual insight” did
not necessarily come from any deep sense of morality nor did it engender
any new religious principles. Although mystical in its origin, this insight
was a non-rational understanding of the nature of combat, drawn from the
founder’s own experience and designed to fit the needs of their social
network (Amdur, 1996a:29-30).
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The ryu-ha continued to be developed into the sixteenth century to systematize
knowledge, and “samurai now approached martial arts not simply as a means to
proficiency in combat, as their ancestors had, but as a means to physical and spiritual
cultivation of the self” (Friday, 1997:14). As ryu-ha formalized, the martial arts became
institutionalized in the late sixteenth century. These schools issued diplomas and licenses
to students, and graduation certificates to disciples who mastered what the teacher had to
offer (Friday, 1997:51). Nevertheless, it was not until the 250 years of peace of the
Tokugawa reign (1603-1868) that budo developed into the form which we can now
recognize as “formalized and businesslike, with ryu-ha headmasters and other adepts
opening commercial training halls and instructing students for fees, turning the teaching
of martial art into a full-time profession” (Friday, 1997:15).
At the close Muromachi period the period of training was usually short, dynamic,
and intense. The training was short because systemization had not yet been fully
developed, and techniques were relatively few and straightforward. But, “...during the
Tokugawa period, as instruction became more professionalized and more
commercialized, apprenticeships became longer [than the Warring States period prior to
1600]; and long with this, more elaborate systems of intermediate ranks began to appear,
allowing students a more tangible measure of their progress” (Friday, 1997:51).
The Tokugawa period saw the proliferation of many ryu-ha, the result of students
drastically changing their teacher’s system. The “new” ryu-ha were usually based on
their teacher’s system, but changed significantly enough to warrant a name change. This
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is best illustrated in the lineage of Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu iaido, a form of
swordsmanship (Illustration 1). The foundation of this particular system is Muso
Shinmei Ryu Battojutsu, founded by Hayashizaki Jinsuke Shigenobu (ca. 1546-1621),
progenitor of many later styles. The term “batto” means to draw the sword, and the term
“jutsu” implies practical techniques (as opposed to “polishing the soul”); battojutsu is the
“harsh act of “striking instantly with the sword” in dealing with the enemy” (Draeger,
1966c:65). Hayashizaki’s immediate successor, Tamiya Heibei Shigemasa, renamed the
ryu-ha as Shin Muso Hayashizaki Ryu, then he branched off and founded Tamiya Ryu,
which is still extant today (Warner and Draeger, 1973:79-84; Mitani, 1994:25-26; Suino,
1994:13; Watanabe, 1993:170-173). However, change was not always welcome,
especially by those who wished to continue a particular tradition, thus preserving it from
extinction. Speaking to the subject of preserving martial traditions, the late-Tokugawa
era commentator Fujiwara Yoshinobu commands, “In order to transmit the essence of the
school to later generations, one must teach faithfully, in a manner not in the slightest
different from the principles of the previous teachers” (Friday, 1997:102).
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Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu Development Flow Chart

Batto Tamiya Ryu

Tamiya Heibei
Shigemasa

Muso Shinmei Ryu
Battojutsu
ca. 1617
Hayashizaki Jinsuke
Shigenobu

1

Shin Muso Hayashizaki
Ryu
Battojutsu

2

Tamiya Heibei
Shigemasa

Muraku Ryu

Shin Muso
Hayashizaki Ryu
Battojutsu

Nagano Muraku
Kinrosai

3

Nagano Muraku Kinrosai

Momo Gunbei Mitsushige
4
Arikawa Shozaemon Munetsugu 5
Banno Dan'emon no Jo Nobusada 6
Muso Jikiden Ryu
Muso Jikiden Eishin
Ryu
ca. 1716-1736
Hasegawa
Chikaranosuke
Eishin

(Raised Knee and Standing Techniques)
(Formal Kneeling Forms Added From Omori Ryu)

Arai Seitetsu Kiyonobu
8
Hayashi Rokudayu Morimasa 9
Hayashi Yasudayu Seisho
10
Oguro Motoemon Kiyokatsu 11

Shimomura Faction
Matsuyoshi Teisuke Hisanari
Yamakawa Kyuzo Yukikatsu
Shimomura Moichi Sadamasa
Hosokawa Yoshimasa

Muso Shinden Ryu
1932
Nakayama Hakudo
Hashimoto Toyo
Saito Isamu

12
13
14
15

7

19

Hasegawa
Chikaranosuke
Eishin
Omori Expelled
by Eishin

Omori Ryu

Hayashi trained
under Omori

Omori
Rokurozaemon
Masamitsu

Tanimura Faction
Matsuyoshi taught Hayashi

16

Hayashi Masu no Jo Masanari
Yoda Manzai Yorikatsu
Hayashi Yadayu Masayori
Tanimura Kame no Jo Yorikatsu
Goto Magobei Masasuke
Oe Masamichi Shikei

12
13
14
15
16
17

Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu
(Reorganized ca.
1912~1926)
Hogiyama Namio
Fukui Harumasa
Kono Hyakuren Minoru
Fukui Torao

17
18

18
19
20
21

Sources: Yoshisato Mitani, Shoka Iai: Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu . (Tokyo: Sukii Jorunaru, 1986), pp. 25-26; Nicklas Suino, The Art of Japanese Swordsmanship:
A Manual of Eishin Ryu . (New York: Weatherhill, 1994) p. 13; Gordon Warner and Donn Draeger, Japanese Swordsmanship . (New York: Weatherhill, 1983),
pp. 79-94; Makoto Watanabe, "Nihon Bugei Ryuso Retsuden." In Hiden! Bugei Ryuso Roku . (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Oraisha, 1993) pp. 170-173.

Illustration 1
Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu Development Flow Chart
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Up to the end of the Tokugawa period, and into the Meiji period (1872-1912) budo
were taught at private dojo; sometimes even at the shogun (de facto national leader)
level, as was the case for the Yagyu Shinkage Ryu of swordsmanship. But never was
there an attempt to organize budo nationwide. That is, not until after the downfall of the
samurai caste in 1876, beginning with the Hattorei, the ban on wearing swords. In John
Clarke’s presentation to the Japanese Martial Arts Society in Tokyo, he states, “An
ambivalent attitude towards swordsmanship prevailed during the early Meiji era. This
general decline in interest reflected the prevailing trend to value only that which had
come from the West. As the new leadership proceeded to dismantle the bushi (samurai)
class they also discouraged the budo, knowing too well the type of courage that they
[budo] breed (Bieri, 1984:4). The “courage” which Clarke refers to is the brash, antiforeigner, conservative line of thought which prevailed in the budo of the day; hardly
what the fledgling government desired as it began its whirlwind pace climbing up from
feudal society into the modern world.
Emperor Meiji, newly thrust into power by progressive samurai factions, was
committed to modernizing his heretofore antique nation. The new government placed a
premium on Western culture and technology; therefore, the caste system was dissolved,
the traditional top-knot was banned, foreign clothing was introduced, and things-Japanese
were held to be passé, or worse, not worth keeping (Kodansha 1993).
Such radical changes in societal values left many conservative former samurai
chagrined at Japan’s perceived fate. Former samurai now had to find other ways of
making a living and left the profession of arms; maintaining the level of personal war-
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craft fell to the wayside. With the decline of samurai fighting traditions, some samurai
embarked on a “budo promotion” journey to show commoners, who rarely witnessed real
martial arts, what the budo really were. These shows were called “Gekken kogyo,”
which means “fencing tournaments” and were to be public displays of traditional budo.
Although well intentioned, the shows became a “pro wrestling”-type of side show as
fight scenarios were prepared, rehearsed and performed. Women
wearing short hakama (a skirt-like trouser) that exposed their thighs were
included. Over-expression became common. Kabuki-like, exaggerated
poses would be struck to the accompaniment of strange sounding “kiai”
vocalizations. Climatic scenes were acted out in which players pretended
to be struck down. To add humor, the floorboards of the stage were oiled
or waxed to cause slipping; and sometimes sake was served and geisha
were hired to offer more entertainment and companionship. These
degenerate gekiken kogyo became extremely popular (Abel, 1984a:13).
However, Abel does point out that there was opposition to these “budo burlesque” shows
by quoting from the June 1873 “News Magazine,” volume 103 in which the Mayor of
Kyoto expresses his disdain for the violence of martial arts. He states,
Gekken kogyo have been held of late, but they seem to be little more
than a means of selling the names of those participating. To worsen
things, they deceive people and expose them to violence. Remember the
saying, ‘Amateur tactics cause grave wounds.’ Moreover, they are very
dangerous considering the way the head, throat and face are aimed for.
These people would do better to utilise their energy and efforts for solid
work, and strive to have a healthy and sound life…. (Abel, 1984:16).

2. THE DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI.
a. The Early Years
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The budo were substantially effected by Japan’s modernization and her 1895 victory over
China. According to Watanabe, the turning point for the modern martial ways was the
formation of the Dai Nippon Butokukai in 1895.
Flushed with victory against China, a group of distinguished
citizens, politicians, and police and military officers along with imperial
support created this organization with the following goals: (1) to preserve
martial virtue (butoku) as represented by the traditional martial
disciplines, (2) to honor the older budo practitioners who had kept the
tradition alive in the face of Westernization and who were the last
generation to have experienced true warrior society, (3) to promote and
propagate the classical martial ways as an education system to help instill
bushido in the minds and bodies of the nation’s youth (Watanabe 1970).
The Butokukai began its mandate and “…unified various schools of
swordsmanship, standardized kendo forms, and issued ranks and titles to skilled kendo
practitioners....Kendo instructors were trained at centers sponsored by the Budokukai
[sic]” (Kiyota 1995). One such of the “various schools of swordsmanship” was Tendo
Ryu, headed by Mitamura Kengyo. Mitamura organized the Seitokusha school to teach
Shinto and budo “in an effort to combat the steady influx of Western influence. In 1895,
his group merged with the Dai Nippon Butokukai” (Amdur, 1996b). In addition to
Kiyota’s observations of kendo, the Butokukai standardized techniques in jujutsu,
archery, naginata (halberd), and other classical forms of martial arts, and was to become a
semi-governmental agency in the 1930s for all things related to budo. Draeger tells us
that, “[s]uch matters as the standardization of techniques and teaching methods, the
qualifications and examinations for instructors, and the issue of teaching ranks and
licenses were the province of the Butokukai” (Draeger, 1996c:47).
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Called a “cultural nationalist organization” by Dann and Monday, the Butokukai
did not promote the classical martial ways for national defense or technical fighting
ability among its members. Its goal was the transmission of traditional martial
disciplines which would allow individuals to feel and experience their samurai heritage
vis-à-vis traditional education. This subtle inculcation would improve morals, elevate
bushido, and prepare Japan’s youth as loyal and healthy citizens of the state (Dann
1978:2; Monday 1985:1).
Illustration 2 is a representation of the composite organization of the Butokukai.
b. The Butokukai and the Monbusho
As early as 1895 the Butokukai tried convince the Monbusho to incorporate
“gekken,” (kendo) in public schools as a required course; however, the Monbusho
refused. The Ministry refused again in 1901 and 1905. Although some within the
Ministry felt the martial ways were “too violent and dangerous for school age youth,” the
final reason for the opposition was financial: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 had
depleted the country’s finances. Budo was too expensive to incorporate at the national
public school level because new equipment and more teachers would be required, and the
national funds were just not available (Dann, 1978:88). It is interesting to note that the
Monbusho’s School of Physical Training had been investigating various schools of
jujutsu hoping to develop that art as a physical fitness subject and that through “…the
efforts of Kano [Jigoro, the founder of Kodokan Judo], the Monbusho recognized judo as
a more “mature” form of jujutsu. In 1887, instruction was started at Tokyo University,
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Keio University, and the Naval Academy as an extra-curricular activity” (Relnick,
1984:17). However, it was not until 1912 that both kendo and judo were finally
sanctioned by the Ministry and incorporated into public school curricula as required
subjects for middle school students (Dann, 1978:90). “Thus,” says Dann, “the Meiji
Period closed with the total acceptance of the modern martial ways (shin budo) albeit in a
modified national form that fit the political and social values of the government” (Dann,
1978:90). The Butokukai began the long process of codifying training pedagogy,
customs, and techniques from the various extant fencing ryu-ha. The Monbusho was
adamant that budo instructors were to also be qualified public school teachers and
sensitive to the students’ age and body type” (Watanabe, 1970:773; as quoted in Dann,
1978:89).
c. The Butokukai and the Army Connection
Although the Butokukai actually represented high ideals and morals, much ill has
been said against the organization at the conclusion of the Second World War. Western
powers did not understand the true aim of the Butokukai, for all they could see was a
Butokukai which had been gradually, little by little, politicized and co-opted by the
Japanese Imperial Army. As a result of the Army’s co-option, and because the budo
were tainted by war rhetoric, American Occupation officials perceived the Butokukai as
an ultra-nationalist tool for propaganda and war preparation.
According to Dann, the militarization and politicization of the budo occurred during the
Taisho and early Showa periods; that is, 1919-1926 and 1926-1945 respectively (1978).
It is during this period of time that kendo and other budo increased in popularity in the
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public schools, local communities, business companies, and police and armed forces
(Dann, 1978:91).

DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI FLOW CHART

Various Koryu Bujutsu
Kenjutsu
(Fencing)

Kyujutsu
(Archery)

Jujutsu

Naginata
(Halberd)

Kama
(Sickle)

Omori Ryu Iaido,
Eishin Ryu Iaido
(Swordsmanship)

Jo
(Staff)

Yari
(Spear)

Keishicho
Tokyo Municipal
Police
(Fencing Division)

Rikugun Toyama
Gakko
1873~1945
(Fencing Division)

Dai Nippon
Butokukai
1895-1945

Kyujutsu
(Archery)

Jujutsu

Naginata

Suiei
(Swimming)

Karate-do
1932

Shagekki
(Marksmanship)
1941

Kenjutsu

Iai
(Sword
Cutting)

Jukenjutsu
(Bayonet)
1941

Influence
Direct Control
Sources: Etsujiro Uehara, "Memorandum to SCAP Commander," (Wasington DC: National Archives, 1946-50); Rikugun Toyama Gakko,
Kenjutsu Kyohan. (Tokyo: 1935); Ichiro Watanabe, Meiji Budo Shi. (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Shueisha).
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Illustration 2
Dai Nippon Butokukai, 1895-1945
Dann goes on to say that participation “in the modern martial ways offered the
opportunity for many Japanese of widely divergent backgrounds to participate in an
officially sanctioned system of physical and mental culture that dramatically
expressed…their ideal of warrior heritage” (1978:91). Dann’s point is well taken that
with the country mobilizing for war, the Japanese government was able to find and utilize
the all-important, common frame of reference required in building consensus or popular
support of future policies. Even amongst the farmers who had no tie to the warrior
tradition, all Japanese came to feel an affinity with the military government through the
trappings of “martial spirit.”
It was in the 1930s, however, that the budo were totally co-opted by the
government as its propaganda machine promulgated, idealized, and spread militaristic
and political trappings throughout the nation (Dann,1978:94); as well, the Butokukai
“increasingly became identified with the political and military national goals rather than
self-perfection, the traditional goal of the budo” (Monday, 1984:1). Since 1915 the
Butokukai had been headed by retired generals or admirals on the theory that they would
be impartial and of high integrity and unrelated to politics. This ideal was followed until
1942 when the Chairmanship automatically fell to the Prime Minister, who happened to
be General Tojo Hideki (US Government, 1945-1948). It was during this latter period
that “the martial arts and the Butokukai increasingly became identified with the political
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and military national goals rather than self-perfection, the traditional goal of the Budo”
(Monday, 1984:1-2).

d. The Butokukai Post 1945
To SCAP officials, the Butokukai represented ultra-nationalistic and para-military
propaganda, and was responsible for preparing Japan’s youth for war. SCAP officials
cannot be held to blame for this view, since combat style training was carried out—but
that was only during Premier Tojo tenure (US Government, 1948:67). Under Tojo’s
reign, activities such as bayonet drill, rifle marksmanship, and hand grenade practice
were included in the Butokukai’s program (National Archives 1946). These practices
were fully explained by Home Minister Uehara Etsujiro in his memorandum to General
Whitney, circa 1946, in which he explains,
[T]he Butokukai was formed [by] followers of the ancient Japanese
art of fencing, judo (jujitsu) and archery and aimed, through improvement
in training and technical skill, at fostering a deportment of frugality,
chivalry, and pride and at elevating character ant training of physique.
Thus it is neither a political, idelogical [sic] body nor a militaristic
body….[I]n addition to fencing, judo and archery (including the arts of
scythe, staff and stick wielding) the two arts of bayonet drill and shooting
were added….[W]ith the surrender…it abolished bayonetting [sic] and
shooting….As far as bayonet drill and shooting were concerned they were
not practised by the Butokukai, but were given training courses mainly in
the Japan War Veterans’ Association…, Bayonetting Advancement
Association…, and the Japan Shooting Association (Olympic member
organization) and in schools. The Butokukai merely conducted tests for
those who disired [sic] them in bayonet drill (National Archives 1945-50).
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Combat related training being taught to civilians should not sound so evil or
radical, as similar activities such as rifle marksmanship and grenade throwing
were carried out in American colleges during the First World War (Svinth 1997b).
Following Japan’s surrender, the Butokukai reorganized itself to its pre-1942 status;
that is, before the Army’s co-option. However, SCAP officials, particularly the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence), believed the reorganization was an attempt to cover up
its war-time activities under the guise of “democratic reorganization.” SCAP officials
did not have a clear understanding of martial arts because of the stain placed on budo by
the Japanese Government since the 1930s when it began to politicize the martial arts,
using budo as an adjunct to forming national polity as a socialization process. (As Sylvia
and Pindur point out in their study of martial arts in America, which may also be applied
to Japan at the time in question, “Socialization also is intensified by making great
demands on the individual’s time and energy and by incorporating rituals and ceremonies
in the socialization process” (Sylvia and Pindur, 1978:216).) Because of this
misperception of the budo, the G2 reinforced his recommendation that the Butokukai be
dissolved by quoting from the organization’s charter, that their goal was “to promote
military arts and to contribute to the training of the people” (US Government, 1948:68).
Defending its mission, Shimura Hisaku, a prominent Butokukai leader from Ibaraki
province expressed the Butokukai’s sentiment:
We wish to introduce to the general public the real nature of military
arts by continuous meetings in various places, and to propagandize the
reason why we should absorb the real spirit of military arts in order to
rebuild a peaceful Japan. We want to have the people acknowledge that
the military arts are obviously not the tools for war, but for peace, and
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are really the national arts of Japan (US Government,1948:68). [Emphasis
added]
Unfortunately for the traditional martial arts, the US did not share the same
paradigm as did Japan about “martial” arts. Still smarting after a hard-earned victory
over the Japanese “martial” spirit, SCAP policy makers could not understand the
apparent dichotomy between “martial arts” and “military combat training.” So alien was
the concept “military arts are obviously not the tools for war, but for peace,” that the
official SCAP record says of Shimura’s statement, “The contradiction inherent in such
rationalization should have been obvious” (US Government,1948:68).
Unfortunately, Americans overall did not then, and still mostly do not today,
understand the spiritual underpinnings so essential to Japanese budo. Although many
Americans had studied jujutsu and judo in America from the early 1910s, apparently
only the competitive “sport” aspect was taught. Sylvia and Pindur’s study indicate that
the values of self mastery, spiritual as well as physical training, martial arts virtues, etc.,
“are not easily transferred from one cultural environment to another” and that the
American karate organizations observed “did not internalize the underlying
philosophical tenets of Buddhism which govern the martial arts in the Orient (Sylvia and
Pindur, 1978:225). Sylvia and Pindur’s research was published in 1978 and reflect the
norms of the time in which there was a martial arts boom and that Oriental philosophy
within the martial arts was trendy. At the supposedly “enlightened” times of the 1970s
it is interesting to find that Americans still did not appreciate or understand the
philosophy of budo; therefore, one can safely interpolate these findings and apply the
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results to the American Occupation authorities of 1945. That is, they had no clue as to
the philosophy of Japanese budo.
As a result of dissolving the Butokukai, 1,312 officials were displaced and barred
from further positions of authority within the Japanese governmental system. The
decision to dissolve the Butokukai and purge its officials was predicated on SCAPIN
548, paragraph I f, couched to eradicate any organization “affording military or quasimilitary training” and provides the “perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in
Japan” (NARA 1946a; US Government, 1948:71-72).
It is noteworthy that the strength which budo binds the Japanese, as part and parcel
of its society. Budo is held in such regard that the Butokukai was restored four months
before the passing of the Self-Defense Forces Law in 1954, in order to promote a healthy
martial spirit among the people of Japan (Harries, 1987:276).
3.

BUSHIDO.

No research involving the study of the budo, or for that matter the Pacific War of
1941-1945, can avoid the study of bushido, the “Way of the knight.” There are
essentially two types of bushido: true bushido, and false bushido. Bushido has been
blamed for the excesses of the Japanese army during the Second World War, and this
blame must be firmly attributed to the Government of Japan. Through its corruption of
ideals, “bushido” was conveniently transformed into the Frankenstein monster of Japan.
That is, essential elements were dismembered from the “true body” and assembled
together to form a vehicle upon which jingoistic, expansionistic, and xenophobic
attitudes could be transported. A new, profane body devoid of “spirit” was reanimated
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and turned loose against society. In the end, its demise was caused from the
misunderstanding of an irate and vindictive “global village.” Bushido, like
Frankenstein’s monster, is not to be blamed for its affront against mankind. However,
unlike Frankenstein’s monster, the true bushido was revived, Lazurus-like, from death
with new life breathed into its body, and its soul again was intact and pure.
Literally translating the Chinese ideographs which comprise “bushido,” we have
“the way of the knight.” Most translators will say “warrior” vice “knight;” however, that
would be an oversimplification of the word “bushi.” In comparison with European
chivalry of the 9th through 15th centuries, a bushi must be likened to a knight. In both
cultures, anybody could be a “warrior,” even the peasants, who, incidentally, were
pressed into combat service, just as English yeoman were archers and light infantry.
However, not just anyone could be a knight.
a. The European Knight: a Comparison to the Japanese Bushi
Becoming a knight began first with birth and parentage. The process extended
through childhood when the male child of a knight or nobleman was sent to the lord or
baron of the area of operations. The child, as a page or attendant to a knight, would learn
horsemanship, courtesy, literature, and the skill of arms. In this case, arms meant lance
and sword; both tools of the trade for the European knight. The term “knight” (cgnigt) is
synonymous with horse—a knight was not a knight without a horse—and the primary
weapon of the knight was the lance. The sword also required wealth to purchase, as it
was an expensive article of purchase—no peasant or lightfoot could afford a sword; it
was the sword that distinguished the knight warrior from the “great unwashed.”
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Upon investiture into knighthood, the page/celebrant was presented a sword, shield,
and spurs as symbols of his status, and he swore to uphold the laws of the lord, right
wrongs, honor women, and protect the weak. In relation to the entire population of the
country it is evident that those who held knight status were microscopically small.
Therefore, there are few today in European nations who can claim direct descent from
medieval knights.
b. The Bushi: a Comparison to the European Knight
I use the term “bushi” instead of the popular term “samurai” for a very pertinent
reason. A bushi was a high-level “knight,” whereas originally a samurai was a servant.
The word “samurai” actually derives from the verb “sabaru,” meaning to serve.
Therefore, samurai were “low-level” warriors who served the bushi. The common use of
the term “samurai” did not come about until the Tokugawa period.
In the “dark ages” of Japanese history at the end of the Muromachi era, anybody
could be a warrior on the battlefield—even peasants. Peasant warriors who proved their
merit in combat could receive recognition and promotion, even become a “great general”
daimyo. One such person, Kinoshita, was a peasant farmer born of a farmer-cumwarrior. Kinoshita’s intelligence caught the attention of his master, Nobunaga, and was
promoted until he became one of Nobunaga’s top strategists. After Nobunaga’s
assassination, Kinoshita—by then known as Hideyoshi Toyotomi, became the supreme
leader of Japan.
However, after Hideyoshi’s day, one could only become a bushi by birth. Male
children would be schooled in literature, arms, etiquette, and civil service. Often male
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children would be adopted into the family of a senior-ranking bushi as part of their
education, as well as to pass on the adopted family name. The status of bushi was
relegated solely unto those within the warrior caste, and outsiders were not permitted.
That is not to say that commoners did not become proficient in the use of arms, as
Japanese history is replete with such stories of “ronin,” the masterless samurai.
However, the tenets of bushido were thoroughly inculcated only within the bushi, not the
other four classes of aristocrat, artisan, farmer, and merchant.
Like their European counterparts, the hoi-polloi were aware of stories and tales of
bravery and “bushido,” but as they did not live the life of the bushi, these other classes
did not have the in-depth understanding of “true bushido.” And just as in the European
paradigm, only 2% of the modern Japanese may claim truly that they descend from the
bushi class. This is the state of affairs in the Japan of the 1930s when the government
used bushido as the mortar to cement its national polity. The government chose
“bushido” as its rallying cry and inculcated its own meaning into the ancient tenets. Few
in Japan were then alive who actually served in the offices of bushi/ samurai, and they
were too old, or too ultra-nationalistic, to profess to the common Japanese that “bushido”
had become contaminated.
As incorrect as it is to claim that all Englishmen are descendants of knights, it is
just as incorrect to say that all Japanese are descended from bushi. Therefore, one cannot
state with any conviction or accuracy that the entire population of a country has been able
to inherit the intrinsic qualities of nobility which, along with proper training, produced
European knights and Japanese bushi. Populations may recite stories and tales of knights
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and bushi, and through this medium be able to recognize what chivalry or bushido are;
but that does not mean that the common people know from experience how to exemplify
these two deeply respected codes.

c. True Bushido
We may well begin this section with a quotation by Douglas MacArthur about the
Japanese culture of warriorship, which was the cultural “mother” of bushido:
For centuries the Japanese people, unlike her neighbors in the Pacific
basin…have been students and idolators [sic] of the art of war and the
warrior caste. They were the natural warriors of the Pacific. Unbroken
victory for Japanese arms convinced them of their invincibility, and the
keystone to the entire arch of their civilization became an almost
mythological belief in the strength and wisdom of the warrior caste. It
permeated and controlled not only all the branches of the government, but
all branches of life—physical, mental, and spiritual. It was interwoven not
only into all government process, but into all phases of daily routine. It
was not only the essence, but the warp and woof of Japanese existence
(MacArthur, 1964:354-355).

Because it is unstated, and inculcated through one’s surroundings, there were
many interpretations at to what true bushido consists. Although teachings and
philosophies differed within the various geographical locations of ancient Japan, it is
interesting that the entire warrior caste had similar perceptions of the meaning: loyalty
and death.
(1) Loyalty.
First, we must understand that the concept of bushido as a code of conduct did not
appear until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Japan was at peace (Friday,
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1994:340). Only during a “peaceful” time could warriors take time to codify and enforce
their house rules; tasks impossible during the constant intrigue of internecine warfare.
Friday explains the thread of loyalty to one’s master harkens back to “the
beginnings of the samurai class and the lord/vassal bond in the eighth century” when
“ties between master and retainer were contractual, based on mutual interest and
advantage, and were heavily conditioned by the demands of self-interest” (Friday,
1994:342). Therefore, the bushi were bound by honor to their lord, as long as they
recognized him as such. If retainers changed sides, so too did their honor. This
explanation should not convey that bushi had no honor, only that honor was provided as
long as they considered themselves “under contract.”
(2) Death.
By far, death has been the main focus of bushido. However, not in the terms of
throwing away one’s life to escape the travesties of life and fate, as is the common
misperception. The emphasis on death within bushido is made so that the warrior can go
into battle with 100% concentration on the task at hand. Therefore, in order to prepare to
fight the great battle effectively, the bushi had to subjugate the natural fear which death
holds over mortal man. Some held these fears could be subdued through constant
training in the budo.
Kato Kiyomasa’s view (circa 1600-1611) of bushido centers around the military
arts and is not as refined as other bushi of the period. Whereas other bushi felt that a
warrior should round out his education with literature and poetry, Kato disdained all
effete practices not related to war, stating that:
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[O]ne should rise at four in the morning, practice sword technique,
eat one’s meal, and train with the bow, the gun, and the horse....If one
should want diversions, he should make them such outdoor pastimes as
falconing, deer hunting, and wrestling....A person who loves beautification
where it is unnecessary is fit for punishment....” (Wilson, 1985:130).
Wilson further explains to us that Kato believed in the cultural synthesis of bubun
[literature and warriorship] but did not go as far as other samurai leaders (1985, 28):
One should put forth effort in matters of learning. One should read
books concerning military matters, and direct his attention exclusively to
the virtues of loyalty and filial piety. Reading Chinese poetry, linked
verse, and waka [31 syllable short poem] is forbidden. One will surely
become womanized if he gives heart knowledge of such elegant, delicate
refinements, Having been born into the house of a warrior, one’s
intentions should be to grasp the long and short swords and to die. If a
man does not investigate into the matter of bushido daily, it will be
difficult for him to die a brave and manly death....” (Wilson, 1985:131-2).
“Life and death were identical, theoretically at least… and his whole purpose in life
was to prepare for death in such manner as to bring honor to his lord, his family, and to
himself” (Buck, 1959:52). In addition to death on the field of battle, bushi at times faced
death at their own hands. Whether to take responsibility for failure, or to reinforce to
others his firm views about unpopular policy, or at the decree of a superior for crimes
committed (or imagined committed) a “samurai schooled in bushido had the moral
supremacy adequate to judge his own actions and this explains the seemingly barbaric
custom of seppuku (hara-kiri). Seppuku was an honorable death reserved to the samurai,
and implicit in the act itself was the samurai’s freedom from the moral judgment of
others” (Buck, 1959:52).
Too much emphasis has been placed on the supreme sacrifice of bushido, that
“death” appears to be the only teaching point. At least, that is the way bushido was
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reinterpreted in the 1930s and 1940s. Real bushido is primarily concerned with the
mental attitudes and goals of the feudal warrior. This aspect has often been forgotten,
misplaced, or misused. Otake Risuke is a master of the Tenshin Shoden Katori Shinto
Ryu of swordsmanship. A long-time student of budo and a “survivor” of the Japan of the
1930s, Otake sensei believes that bushido was grossly distorted from its original meaning
when it was used to sanctify militaristic and nationalistic feelings and activities (Reid and
Croucher, 1983:148). In Reid and Croucher’s interview, Otake sensei clears up the
misinterpretation that bushido is equated to ‘seeking death’:
…the meaning of bushido is not just to go out and die. Because of
this kind of misunderstanding, people in foreign countries think that
bushido is synonymous with seppuku....Actually, the meaning of bushido
is to do something in the world, to leave something behind and then to be
able to throw away the human body and to accept death....It is something
quite different from just going out and dying. If you try to achieve
something, but for some reason you fail and then say, “I’ve failed, I must
kill myself”, that is not a very productive way of thinking. Bushido has
nothing to do with so irresponsible a way of living.
If you have tried to perform some act and failed, there is also in
bushido the concept of continuing to live, even though you may have to
live in shame, there is the possibility that you may be able to rectify the
wrong you have done, or to correct the situation you have caused. This is
real bushido.
Real bushido is concerned with the spirit of self-sacrifice. The
meaning of this spirit of self-sacrifice is that you will make the effort to
help people or to do something good in the world, even to the point of it
costing you your life, it is for some good purpose” (Reid and Croucher,
1983:148-149).
Supporting Otake sensei’s vision of bushido, the widow of General Yamashita
Tomoyuki states, “My husband was a man of great responsibility who would never have
committed hara-kiri. He felt he could not die until all his men had been looked after”
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(Potter, 1962:178). Surely, there is here evidence of a deeper service commitment which
is elsewhere engraved above a stone gate, “Duty, Honor, Country.”
d. Bushido’s essence.
The essence of bushido may be boiled down to “duty, honor, and loyalty.” It is the
beau ideal in which one selflessly gives service and endures hardships for the betterment
of one’s society, country, superior, or liege. Contemporary views from 1905 through the
present day can better provide a more succulent flavor of true bushido, therefore, I
present the following views.
In 1888 a British cavalry officer was sent on a mission to teach 20th century warfare
to the new, “modern” Japan. During his tenure he became one of the first Europeans to
study, and become very proficient after 15 years, what today is called kendo (Norman,
1905:49). It is interesting that in this example, the teacher became the student, and
converted to the ancient Japanese warfare and philosophy with the passion of a zealot.
He states,
[B]ushido, or “the way of the warrior,” soon became, as it still is, a
most important factor in the education, guidance and training of the
Japanese soldier and official. But about this same bushido a great deal of
nonsense has been written of late; for, comparing it with the chivalry of
the West, we find that while the European knight considered it his duty to
respect women and the weakness and unpreparedness of a foe, the bushi,
on the other hand, held to the maxim that “all is fair in love and war,” and
scrupled not to resort to devices of the most dishonourable kind in order to
gain a desired object” (Norman, 1905:2).
Norman’s retort about “…a great deal of nonsense has been written of late….” was
unquestionably aimed at the “great Christian apologist, Nitobe” (Dann, 1978:86), who
attempted to explain bushido to the West in terms of his adopted Christian faith’s ideals.
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Nitobe removed bushido from its historical context and justified it by paralleling
bushido’s virtues with those of medieval Europe (Kiyota 1995). However, Nitobe should
not be taken to task so harshly. In his day, to the Western world, anything not “White”
was considered inferior. Nitobe was attempting to explain how his “inferior” country
was able to defeat a great white nation in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In
order to make his ideas palatable to the Victorian readers, he qualified everything with an
“acceptable” Christian or European flavor.
Nitobe’s book Bushido did not gain kudos in his own country if Kunishige
Nobuyuki’s comments are to be considered standard within the budo community of the
late 1800s. Kunishige, a master of fencing, archery, spear, jujutsu, and other budo states,
The essence of bushido is contained in the martial arts....(Dr. Nitobe)
recently published a work on bushido in which he says that bushido is a
moral teaching which favourably compares with the moral doctrines
taught in the various countries of the world; and he then proceeds to
remark that bushido is independent of fencing, judo and other martial arts.
I do not agree with this gentleman in the latter remark.
In my opinion, the martial arts are important parts of the structure
which is termed bushido. Without the martial arts bushido, however noble
and lofty it may be, must fade into nothingness. Loyalty and justice are
the precepts of bushido and the martial arts are the essential means of
attaining the object in view. Bushido imposes upon men the sacrifice of
their lives for the cause of loyalty and justice. But when an emergency
calls upon us to die in defence of the State we can be of little service if we
are ignorant of the martial arts” (Harrison, 1983:113).
Harrison instructs us that bushido surpasses even religion and other moral teachings
because it gives prompt chastisement to wrongdoers. “Bushido” he writes, “calls upon
men to rise to the succour of their fellow-creatures in danger from bandits, robbers and
other evil-doers, even at the sacrifice of their lives.” Ever the diligent pupil, Harrison
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echoes his teacher in his belief that “[a] person ignorant of the martial arts can do little to
help others a the call of bushido if he is ignorant of the martial arts” (Harrison,
1983:114).
Although bushido is ingrained through practice in the budo, it is not only about
martial arts. According to Wilson, bushido teaches the way to the total man as he
embarks along a journey to the fuller self. In today’s Western culture the scholar and
poet are doveish, whereas the military man is hawkish—too martial and devoid of
feeling; each inhabiting a mutually exclusive position. The Japanese bushi attempted to
bridge the abyss. If the ideal was not realized, they did maintain and preserve it (Wilson,
1985:34). And even if the ideal was not realized or maintained or preserved, at least the
concepts of bushido were passed down to the current generation of budo practitioners;
modern martial arts are now seen as a way becoming the “total man” and fulfilling the
“fuller self” as a corollary to the physical training.
Buck’s 1959 explanation of bushido is that it was not an institution and had no
founder, was not codified, and was not eclectic system of ethics. Influenced by the
Chinese classics and Zen Buddhism, it was a distinctively Japanese means of personal
development that emphasized bravery and selfless service above all. Bushido strove to
develop self-knowledge, or impersonality; self-mastery, equanimity in all situations,
rectitude, propriety, courage, valor and stoicism. Etiquette and manners were essential as
a manifestation of a cultured soul (Buck, 1959:52). The bushido ideals represented the
consciousness of the Japanese warrior-elite and formed the intellectual and psychological
foundation for policy decisions of the high-born samurai leaders (Buck, 1959:53-54).
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Draeger provides a view of bushido which may be considered “official” Japanese
policy as it is taken from the Kokutai no Hongi [National Polity Fundamentals] of the
1930s:
Our nation is one that holds bushido in high regard….But this
martial spirit is not [a thing that exists] for the sake of itself but for the
sake of peace, and is what may be called a sacred martial spirit. Our
martial spirit does not have for its objective the killing of men, but the
giving of life to men. This martial spirit is that which tries to give life to
all things, and is not that which destroys…It is a strife which has peace at
its basis with a promise to raise and to develop; and it gives life to things
through its strife. Here lies the martial spirit of our nation. War, in this
sense, is not by any means intended for the destruction, overpowering, or
subjugation of others, and it should be a thing for the bringing about of
great harmony, that is, peace, doing the work of creation by following the
Way (Draeger, 1996c:45).
And elsewhere, the Japanese American view of bushido was that of imparting
benevolence and character building. Svinth quotes Okajima Kenya’s article in the North
American Times, 22 August 1939:
Benevolence…is Bushido’s essential teaching… ‘Benevolence is to love
universally’…The Samurai’s sword was not intended to kill and destroy,
It was the emblem of his soul, and was to be used for defending his honor,
and protecting women, children, and the weak. In kendo, the fencing stick
represents the precious sword. Due regard was given to it and its
significance, so that the character building of the participants might be
unconsciously affected. Kendo, or the precepts of the Sword, therefore
exercise a great moral influence upon the boys and girls of Japan (Svinth,
1977:2).
According to Svinth (1977), the bushido qualities stressed in kendo prompted many
Japanese-American parents of the 1920s and 1930s to enroll their children in local kendo
courses, and thus impart and maintain a sense of culture, morality, and identity.
e. Corrupted Bushido.
“Many of the worst crimes perpetrated by the Japanese were committed in the sacred name of Bushido”
Lord Russell of Liverpool
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The Bushido that the Butokukai “promoted was that of the classical warrior, not the
nationalistic hodgepodge which came to be called Bushido in the 1930s and 40s
(Monday, 1984:2). Therefore, the question is begged, “what became of bushido in the
1930s and 40s?” Research shows that the Japanese used bushido as a method of
sanctifying ultra-nationalism (Friday 1994, Tanaka 1996) and, later, for rationalizing
battlefield atrocities (Rosenberg 1995, Russel 1948). At the conclusion of the Second
World War the Western powers had a misconception of bushido based on observed
Japanese military conduct which was being called “bushido.” But the Imperial Army
connection to bushido and the samurai tradition was not just a Western artifice; it was an
important part of Japan’s early propaganda and remained a favorite theme of Japanese
militarists and right-wing essayists right up to Japan’s defeat in 1945 (Friday, 1994:340).
I wish to note at this point that bushido never was the cause of barbarity and
cruelty, and I shall explain how “bushido” was used as a euphemism for misconduct.
However, because of the perceived relation between bushido and cruelty, the Western
powers would later attribute “corrupted” bushido with budo; ergo, promote a cessation of
anything closely related to “budo,” “bushido,” and “butoku.”
Speaking to bushido, one Soviet historian offers the flawed implication that the
battlefield code of the samurai taught that Japan and Japanese were superior to other
countries and peoples (Zhukov 1977). I think it is instructive to provide Zhukov’s
quotation in full so that we may get a flavor of his line of thought:
The cult of the warrior existed in Japan since time immemorial.
Although the samurai estate was abolished following the bourgeois
revolution of 1867-68, the feudal code of the samurais was kept alive in
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the Army and Navy under developed capitalism. This code was founded
on the teaching that Japan and the Japanese were superior to other
countries and peoples, and it was proclaimed the basic principle of
conduct on the battlefield (Zhukov, 1977:271).
Here, Zhukov mixes the Japanese propaganda of the 1930s and 40s with bushido, or
at least one infers he is speaking of bushido. The important note here is that Zhukov
wrote in the late 1970s when animosity with Japan had subsided (except for the Kurile
Islands issue between Japan and the then Soviet Union).
“[T]he legacy of the samurai has its sinister side” (Friday, 1994:339) for those who
fought or were occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War. This is the
legacy of “corrupted bushido” (Tanaka, 1996:206). However, labeling the Imperial
Army’s ideology as bushido “involves some fairly overt historian’s sleight-of-hand”
(Friday:1994:340).
Japan’s jingoistic paradigm that initiated the Asia-Pacific War and the societal
values of the officers and soldiers are believed, by some, to be a by-product of the ancient
code of warrior behavior called bushido (Friday, 1994:339). However, it is incorrect to
believe that these military men received a thorough education in true bushido—by
osmosis—because few of samurai lineage were actually in military service. According to
Donn F. Draeger, around the end of the 1890s the military was in a
state of moral decay….Neither group of the new generation of
officers was recruited from the families of ex-samurai, a practice
Yamagata [Aritomo, Army Minister] had insisted upon. Instead, they
came entirely from the peasantry, and literally were Yoshida Shoin’s
“grass-roots heroes” put in roles of leadership that they had neither the
temperament nor the sense of moral obligation to assume. They were men
from families that had been completely dissociated from the classical
warrior traditions. The result, therefore, could hardly have been different,

32

for these men obviously could have had no real understanding or
appreciation of the rigid ethical values of the traditional warrior
institutions (1996c:43).
In the early Meiji period (circa 1868-1880), the military code of conduct was still
strongly influenced by bushido; however, it had fully vanished from the armed forces by
1920 (Tanaka, 1996:206). Therefore, these new “samurai” were indoctrinated with a
new, tainted concept of bushido that, according to Wayne Muromoto, “engendered a very
negative connotation when Japan built up its regular conscript army and began imperial
hostilities, which led to World War II” (1996:11). Muromoto continues:
Japan’s soldiery, now a modern army with its ranks filled with
commoner draftees, were exhorted to live up [to] the ideals of “bushido,”
although most of the soldiers were farmer and merchant sons who had
never ever been exposed to the finer points of Neo-Confucianism (the
philosophy of the Edo-period samurai) or the deep discipline of the
bujutsu (Muromoto, 1996:11).
To further complicate the misunderstanding of bushido, Western soldiers who once
had been assigned as liaison officers or observers to the Japanese army in the 1930s, or
those who compiled research, wrote of their experiences (Doud 1942, Gayne 1942, Lorry
1943, Scofield 1942, and Thompson 1942). These writings were published during the
1940s in books (Lorry, Gayne) and magazines like The Infantry Journal, the trade
publication of the US Army officer corps. One such article attempted to explain the
Japanese soldier’s battlefield conduct as an extenuation of a common samurai heritage:
The modern Jap soldier is the product of centuries of internecine
warfare that made the island kingdom one vast blood-soaked
battlefield....no quarter was ever shown....all prisoners—men, women, and
children—were all beheaded....Up to 1870 it was the usual Japanese
procedure to collect heads after every battle....The paradoxical Samurai
code is as high in many of its standards as that of King Arthur’s Knights;
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at the same time, it authorizes the most despicable treacheries and
brutalities (Clear, 1942:16-17).
4. BUSHIDO’S NEW PARADIGM.
It is not the fault that Western powers identified bushido with cruelty. It was in the
1920s and 30s that changes were being implemented within the political ideas and ethics
of the military. “One of the most important changes was the reinterpretation—or more
plainly, corruption—of the ethical code of bushido...in order to subordinate it to the
emperor ideology and the new military ideology. The inculcation of trainee officers in
the emperor ideology at the military college gave them a very distorted understanding of
bushido” (Tanaka, 1996:206).
a. Bushido inhumanity?
“It is often held that the inhumane conduct of the Japanese during the AsiaPacific War arose from within bushido itself. The Japanese Field Service Code,
Senjinkun, which among other things required that soldiers commit suicide rather than
surrender, and the Imperial Code of Military Conduct, Gunjin Chokuron, which
demanded absolute loyalty to the emperor, were both held to carry the essence of
bushido. All Japanese soldiers as well as Formosan and Korean prison guards were
required to memorize them, and much of their understandings of bushido would have
come from these codes. Prisoners of the Japanese also believed that the cruelty of their
captors stemmed from bushido (Tanaka, 1996:206-7).
“Does bushido justify cruelty? To answer this question it is necessary to look at
the details of the code, which consists of seven elements ….righteousness…courage…
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humanity…propriety…sincerity…honor…loyalty….In summary, it can be seen from the
elements of the code that bushido requires great self-discipline together with great
tolerance toward others. So how and why were the demands for tolerance and
compassion in bushido forgotten?….The Imperial Code of Military Conduct, which was
issued in 1882 by Emperor Meiji, emphasized five elements that every Japanese soldier
must respect: loyalty, propriety, courage, righteousness, and simplicity. The code held
that sincerity underlay all five elements. Justice and morality were also emphasized. It is
clear that the code was heavily influenced by bushido….Nothing in the conduct code
could possibly be taken as justification for the cruel treatment of POWs. Article 3
requiring the soldier to respect courage, states that violent and impetuous acts can never
be acts of courage. It was also stated that the courageous soldier must treat others with
love and respect (Tanaka, 1996:207).
b. The Field Service Code of 1941.
“The Ministry of War’s 1871 instructions to the troops listed seven character traits
that soldiers should strive for: loyalty, decorum, faith, obedience, courage, frugality, and
honor…the Imperial Rescript to the Military promulgated on Jan. 4, 1882 listed five such
traits: loyalty, decorum, courage, faith, and frugality. (Apparently the government had
lost interest in keeping its troops obedient and honorable during the intervening eleven
years)” (Friday, 1994:343).
The Field Service Code of 1941 was codified to prevent the sort of crimes
committed by Japanese soldiers in the Nanjing massacre of 1937 by tightening the
definitions of how soldiers should conduct themselves. Specifically, it addressed the
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humane treatment of prisoners of war. Clearly, the ethic in which the ill-treatment of
POWs was justifiable did not originate from within bushido but rather from the
corruption of it (Friday, 1994:346; Tanaka, 1996:208). However, one may infer from
Friday’s translation of the Senjinkun--that death is preferable to life as a prisoner of war-the Japanese soldier was provided the logic to rationalize their cruel behavior: “One who
knows shame is strong….Do not endure the shame of being made prisoner while alive;
die and do not leave behind the sullied name of one who foundered and fell” (Friday,
1994:348).
c. Atrocities in the name of bushido.
Clearly we see that Russell’s declaration, “[t]he uncivilized ill-treatment of
prisoners of war by the Japanese was the natural outcome of the code of Bushido, which
was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training” (Russell, 1948:46),
is incorrect. However, when Russell states, “many of the worst crimes perpetrated by the
Japanese were committed in the sacred name of Bushido” (Russell, 1948:163), he is right
on the mark. Russell provides an appropriate example in the translated entry from the
diary of a captured Japanese soldier who witnessed the execution of an Allied aircrew
member on 30 Mar 43:
...Unit Commander Komai...told us personally that, in accordance
with the compassionate sentiments of Japanese Bushido, he was going to
kill the prisoner himself with his favourite sword....[H]e tells the prisoner
that in accordance with Japanese Bushido he will be killed with a Japanese
sword....The savageness which I felt only a little while ago is gone, and I
feel nothing but the true compassion of Japanese Bushido (Russell,
1948:64-65).
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Bushido “was a propaganda tool, consciously shaped and manipulated as part of the
effort to forge a unified, modern nation out of a fundamentally feudal society, and to
build a modern national military made up of conscripts from all tiers of society” (Friday,
1994:342). However, no matter how much propaganda is fed to a populace, there will be
those who are not “properly” inculcated. On at least one occasion during the Pacific
War, a mass desertion under fire occurred during the opening hours of General
Yamashita Tomoyuki’s invasion of the Malay Peninsula on 7 December 1941. On that
morning a large self-propelled landing barge containing thirty men and two officers had
come to within thirty yards of the beach when it suddenly turned around and went out to
sea. Later, the men admitted they planned to desert in the face of the enemy and had even
stock-piled rations in advance (Potter, 1962;58). Amazingly, this act -- which is the
antithesis of the force-fed “corrupted bushido”— happened on the opening day of
hostilities against the West.
General Percival, who surrendered Singapore to General Yamashita, feels Japanese
atrocities could be attributed to medieval behavior, from which Japan was unable to
extricate itself due to the relative short time in adopting the Western idea of civilization.
“It is a great pity that the Japanese commanders allowed and sometimes even ordered the
atrocities which were committed by their officers and men. But that again may be due in
some measure to the lack of time since their country emerged from its isolation. There
was not enough time to absorb fully the accepted doctrines of civilisation” (Percival,
1949). However, Friday—an historian of Japanese history—disagrees that the Imperial
Forces were adhering to medieval standard operating procedures, citing that
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“[m]assacring or otherwise mistreating the occupants of newly captured territories
was…counterproductive” because it would leave fewer workers in the newly acquired
fields (Friday, 1994:346). In opposition to Dr. Friday’s view, Ellis Amdur—an historian
and practitioner of Japanese martial arts—paints a different scene of twelfth century
Japan: “Although downplayed or ignored in the battle-tales, slaughter and rapine of noncombatants was the rule, not the exception. The women and children of the leaders of
[the] defeated side were usually killed, and women of lesser rank were given to the
warriors as spoils-of-war” (Amdur, 1995:18). Despite Friday feeling that “the
connection between Japan’s modern and premodern military traditions is thin”
(1994:345), there is an unfortunate parallel. Following the Imperial Guards Division
establishing a beachhead on the Maur River in Malaya on or about 21 January 1942, they
summarily beheaded 200 Australian and Indian prisoners of war (Potter, 1962:72). To
Friday, this is “aberrant, if not outright degenerate conduct by Japanese as well as
western standards” (Friday, 1994:346). Unfortunately, Japan’s military history is
virtually saturated in the blood of this type of “aberrant” behavior in foreign countries.
During Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Korea campaigns of 1592 and 1597 (Kodansha,
1993:621), he ordered the noses and ears of defeated combatants and non-combatants to
be cut off, pickled, and sent back to Japan. The body parts were so voluminous that the
pile was called “Ear Mountain.” It must be said in defense of objectivity that
Hideyoshi’s advisors, generals, soldiers—and the public in general—were all revolted by
this particular show of cruelty. Kodansha’s Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia portrays
Hideyoshi as a brilliant strategist and shrewd politician who, untypical of his day,

38

showed a generosity toward his enemies (p:1617). Obviously, Hideyoshi--like his 20th
century progeny--was better behaved at home than during his overseas campaign.
5. EDUCATING THE NATION--ACADEMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY.
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, educating Japan’s youth was seen as a
way to build a strong nation which could compete in the world economy and hold its
own. Therefore, the new Meiji government established a policy of providing education
to all subjects. No mention of education is complete without the inclusion of a reference
to the Meiji Rescript on Education that was read aloud daily in all classrooms. Usual
post-war mention attributes the Rescript as providing a basis for the nationalization of
youth, and it is often portrayed as a sinister document. The Far Eastern Commission
drafted a policy recommending “Imperial rescripts should not be used as a basis of
instruction, study, or ceremonies in schools” (FEC 1947:95). However, I wish to go one
step further and provide a copy of the original document (Illustration 2) along with its
entire translation to assert there is nothing wrong with the rescript. If the principles
within this rescript are wrong, then by the same inference our “Pledge of Allegiance”
could be considered wrong.
a. The Meiji Rescript on Education.
KNOW YE OUR SUBJECTS:
Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a broad and everlasting, and
have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects ever united in loyalty and
filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is
the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire, and herein lies the source of
our education. Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your
brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear
yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue
learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect
moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests;
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always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer
yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of
our Imperial throne, coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye be not only our good
and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.
The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial
Ancestors, to be observed alike by their descendants and the subjects, infallible for all
ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart, in all reverence, in
common with you our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.
The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji (Oct. 30, 1890)

Mutsuhito
[Imperial Seal]
(Hokubei Butokukai,1939:4-5)

40

Source: Sasaki Morio. 1990. Nippon no Kokoro: Jidai wo Ninau Seishonen e. Tokyo:Mizuho Shobo

Illustration 3
Meiji Rescript on Education (Original Facsimilie)
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As is apparent, nothing is sinister in the format or wording of the rescript, unless offense
is taken at the sentence, “…should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the
state….” However, this is probably the one sentence within the rescript which held the
most propaganda value to the government. That the rescript came directly from Emperor
Meiji is the strongest inducement amongst the common person to comply with the State’s
request to arm and mobilize the youth. And that this sentence was included in the
rescript further gives credence to the theory that the “medium used to
develop the frame of mind necessary in time of war was the educational system (Draeger,
1996c:47).
b. A brief history of the education system, 1917-1945.
The educational system, centrally controlled by the Monbusho without the inclusion
of a local school board or superintendent (MacArthur, 1964:356), had a broad-range
impact in inculcating Japan’s youth in preparation for war.
Military training was included in the school curriculum from the Meiji period
(1868-1912) through the end of World War II and was based on the government policy
expressed as fukoku kyohei: rich country, strong military. Infantry exercises were carried
out in the 1880s and military style calisthenics were incorporated. After the 1905
victory over Russia the military education trend in public schools became stronger and
military courses called kyoren were established in elementary and secondary schools for
both boys and girls (Kodansha, 1983:175).
In 1917 military training was included and emphasized in order to promote the
concept of Kokutai, the national polity (Kodansha, 1993:325). After the First World War
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career army officers were assigned to the faculty of middle and higher schools, and
college preparatory schools (Kodansha, 1983:175). In 1925 youth training centers with a
four-year curriculum of vocational, physical, and military training were established by
Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, both army ministers. The centers were run by
elementary school principals, his teaching staff, and the local reservists who provided
over 100 hours of military drill and 100 hours of other instruction to the 85% of Japanese
men who did not go on to middle school (Kodansha, 1983:174). Following the
Manchurian Incident in 1931, educational policy became ultra-nationalistic; however, it
was after the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 that the educational policy transformed to
a militaristic format. In 1939 the Seinen Gakko, or Boys Schools, a combination of
vocational and military schools, were established and became compulsory for elementary
school graduates. In 1941 the elementary schools were reorganized under the name
Kokumin Gakko, National Peoples School, which were used to train subjects for the
empire (Kodansha, 1993:325-326), and used Monbusho-approved textbooks “filled with
militaristic and anti-American items” (MacArthur, 1964:356). Colonel Clear will later
provide a clear “snapshot” of the militaristic schooling which young boys underwent as
part of their “education.”
c. Youth and military training.
The budo at this point were well established both in public school (kendo, judo, and
naginata) and had ties to the Butokukai, which trained budo instructors and promoted
performance based on codified techniques. However, not only were martial arts taught at
public schools, but so was military training. This training is similar in form to the
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modern Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) held on some American grade
school campuses. The main difference being that Japanese school military training was
compulsory and was actually based on real military training. Conversely, JROTC is
concerned about teaching some drill and ceremony, history, and self-esteem.
Colonel Clear paints a very clear picture of boy’s training:
Not even the people of Germany and Italy have known such
regimentation as the people of Japan have passively accepted for
centuries. For years before induction, the conscript has been fired by
recitals of supreme sacrifice and devotion....At the Yasukuni-jing[u],
famous military memorial to departed heroes, I once saw a hundred
thousand schoolboys assembled, caps in hand, bowing low in deep
reverence. The Minister of War, and later Premier, General Ugaki,
standing beside me and watching the impressive sight, smiled as he
remarked, “Thus we plant the hemp in preparation for braiding rope.”
The child’s military training begins at the age of six when he straps
on his first knapsack and goose-steps around the schoolyard singing
military songs. At twelve he is in uniform, carrying a light rifle, and
participating in annual maneuvers involving light field guns and hand
grenades. At fifteen he is shouting battle cries as he charges up a hill o
take a simulated enemy position with the bayonet. A year later he is
throwing live grenades, and driving plyboard tanks through the fields of
his school. At nineteen he has already marched twenty-five miles in a day
with his school battalion, rifle, pack and all; dug trenches, filled in
latrines, strung barbed wire, and studied mapping. He has forded
shoulder-deep, ice-cold mountain streams, slogged through mud and dust,
and cooked his handful of rice in a little bucket over an open fire with
perhaps a few sardines and a swallow of tea to wash it down. Then, back
to school again, after days in the field, he resumes his schedule of
reporting at 0600 hours on cold winter mornings for fencing and judo
(wrestling) in an open air gymnasium (Clear, 1942:18).
The military training provided to the public school came from the reserve
association for both military drills and fencing (including bayonet drills). Martial arts
training figured prominently in Japanese society since the 1930s, and even comic books
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and other magazines featured budo geared for war. “Shin Budo” [New Martial Arts]
regularly featured service men throwing grenades, or test-cutting with swords; senior
citizens practicing with wooden swords; or school children practicing swordsmanship
with real swords (Takahara, 1992:82-83). The emphasis on budo is explained by Richard
Smethurst in his 1974 book, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism:
From the army’s and community’s point of view, reservist-led drill
and martial arts training for young men was one of the most important of
the organization’s military activities. The army was not able to conscript
and “socialize for death” a generation of prewar Japanese males, as
Kazuko Tsurumi says, but it could and did discipline and indoctrinate a
very high percentage of rural teenage males through the youth association
and the youth centers and schools (154).
Smethurst proceeds, “By the time the army led Japan into the China and then the
Pacific wars, many years had been spent in educating young Japanese in military values
and skills” (Smethurst, 1974:155). However well Japan trained its youth in military
skills, that was not enough. The spirit of the samurai had to be inculcated so that students
would identify themselves directly with the samurai, or to the samurai heritage. This was
best done through kendo, a modern version of fencing with the long Japanese sword, in
which a substitute sword of tubular split bamboo is used. “Closely related to military
drill was reservist-directed martial arts training. [Reservist] leaders gave rifle, bayonet,
and sword training to their followers, to youth association members, to youth school
students and, on occasion, even to women” (Smethurst, 1974:157). Smethurst continues:
The bayonet and sword training also prepared the young men to
take part in community-wide and district level competitions. The bayonet
training (jukenjutsu or jukendo) and competition, in which participants
fought with long wooden staves in the shape of rifles with fixed bayonets,
was the twentieth century military’s addition to Japan’s “traditional”
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martial arts and thus one which virtually disappeared from the sports’s
scene after 1945. Sword fighting (kendo), on the other hand, the martial
skill which separated the Tokugawa warrior from his social subordinates,
had a long premodern history. All three types of training – rifle, bayonet,
and sword – taught young men discipline, imperviousness to pain,
controlled violence, and ultimately an ability to rise above the fear of
death (Smethurst, 1974:157).
d. Training women.
According to Smethurst, not only were boys subject to military arts training, but
also women. “On at least one occasion,” he writes, “the women were trained in military
skills. After 1943, the reservists mobilized the women for the famed “bamboo spear”
defense groups. Home guard units of women were set up to help defend Japan against
the expected invasion” (Smethurst, 1974:158). Nakamura Taizaburo is an 86 year old
modern master of the sword. Nakamura sensei corroborates Smethurst’s statement and
asserts that, “In 1945 the US forces landed on Okinawa. My Division was reassigned
from the Chinese continent to Kyushu [southern Japan] in order to prepare for a land
battle on our own land. In Kyushu and other areas I, as a fencing master, was sent to
home guard units to conduct bamboo spear training” (Nakamura, 1995:274). Iwasaki
Yasue, 70, also underwent this type of training on the northern island of Hokkaido.
“During the war I was taught naginatajutsu and received 2nd dan; it was a required course
for girls. At the end of the war we girls were taught bamboo spear techniques.
Essentially we were to wait for American paratroopers to descend, then spear their
genitals before they hit the ground” (Iwasaki, 1997).
e. Naginata: an historical precedence for arming women.
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Precedence for arming women and using them in combat was set in 1232 when “the
Joei Code supplanted the old Imperial Code. Containing 51 chapters, it became the legal
system of the Hojo [family which ruled Japan from 1203-1333]. Interestingly, one of the
laws was that women were allowed to inherit property and act as bushi [warriors] on an
equal footing with men” (Amdur, 1995:20). Amdur goes on, “[m]edieval women could
go to war, although they did not do so, by choice, in any significant numbers (the most
famous women warriors were Tomoe Gozen and Hangaku of Jo). Most women who
found themselves on the battlefield did so in extremis; when invaders broke through the
defenses of a castle or estate, and women became part of the last-ditch resistence [sic]”
(Amdur, 1995:25).
At the end of the Warring States Period and the introduction of (relative) national
peace in 1603 by Tokugawa Ieyasu, “the naginata became obsolete as a weapon of war
and was assigned to the women of warrior families for the defense of the home. They, in
turn, were required to master its application by the time they reached the age of eighteen”
(Riley, 1995:34).
“As part of the [naginata] training for teachers, Nitta [Suzuyo, 19th generation lineal
successor to the Toda ha Buko Ryu] was told that the most important thing was to boost
the girls’ morale and strengthen their spirit in case of an enemy landing. Nitta said that
the girls liked the training, which was done in place of “enemy sports” such as baseball
or volleyball” (Amdur, 1996c). Apparently this tradition lasted until today, except that
training in naginata is done for grace, poise, sport, and other non-combat attributes.
f. Education and godly winds.
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Having a slight background knowledge of the Japanese education system, what
MacArthur calls “an official propaganda machine” which “existed for the purpose of
‘thought control’” (1964:357), makes it easier to understand how Japan’s soldiers were
willing participants in kyokusai special assault charges (known to the West as “banzai
charges”). Kamikaze pilot training was enhanced by the systematic and organized public
school education system of 1917-1945 where students were taught to die for the emperor.
By late 1944, the slogan Jusshi Reisho (Sacrifice Life) was taught, making such efficient
“brainwashing” [Kamikaze training] possible. (Morimoto, 1992:148-151).
Sasaki Mako agrees, saying that “[m]ost of the [Kamikaze] pilots who volunteered
for the suicide attacks were those who were born late in the Taisho period (1912-1926) or
in the first two or three years of Showa. Therefore, they had gone through the
brainwashing education, and were the products of the militaristic Japan” (Sasaki, 1995).
“The effect of the brainwashing that the military had done to the students is
surprising. The pilots felt it was “obvious” that they were to take part in the Kamikaze
attacks” (Sasaki, 1995). Sasaki’s research is interesting in that she interviewed former
Kamikaze pilots, those who had to abort their mission, or whose numbers did not yet
come up. She found that the Kamikaze pilots were generally happy that they could serve
the country, but had other thoughts towards death. The training in public school,
reinforced by military induction training, was strong enough to change life’s basic
priority of “self then country” to “country then self.” The first priority became the
Emperor and the country. She also discovered that the college graduates may have felt
fear (Sasaki 1995). Sasaki further tells us that some of the college graduate pilot recruits
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even wrote letters home which were not the standard “cherry blossom falling into the
ocean” letter home. One pilot even stated he was not eager to die, and was going to miss
his girlfriend (Sasaki 1995).
g. Shushin and Shinto.
(1) Shushin. No mention of the Japanese education system is complete without
mentioning shushin, the moral education provided in the public school system until 1945.
These daily classes stressed Confucian moral virtues such as respect, loyalty, and
obedience of subordinate too superior (Neide, 1995:36; quoting Rohlen 1983). The
Shushin-sho, Moral Training Manual, was the vehicle used to teach manners, filial piety,
and decorum. The lessons were usually exemplified by Taro (“Johnny”), who in one
example advises his friend that they should not take fruit from a tree because the tree
belongs to the farmer, not them (Hall 1949). Earlier editions, circa 1932, even introduce
lessons from foreign countries; usually to emphasize thriftiness, hard work, and service.
Even examples from Benjamin Franklin’s and Thomas Jefferson’s lives were highlighted.
The lessons on thrift, honesty, and proper decorum are commendable; however, after
reading selections from the Shushin-sho, one easily sees the constant, subtle push
towards militarism, expansionism, and national service. The following passages were
extricated from Robert Hall’s 1949 monograph, Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated
Nation:
Ever since the Conscription Law was passed in the 6th year of
Meiji [1873] all the people of the land must [with the implication of an
honor bestowed] become soldiers to guard the country. Before the Meiji
era only the warriors [samurai] were permitted the honor of guarding the
country. But since the law was passed under the leadership of His
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Majesty as the Supreme Commander of Army and Navy forces, a strong
Imperial Army has been organized, with every subject developing his
fighting spirit, receiving discipline as a soldier, and improving his military
effectiveness. We have fought several wars since then and have
demonstrated our national power before the eyes of the world.
Our territory has been expanded, but its expansion has not been
compatible with the increase in population. Consequently many people
have left the country to live in Manchukuo [Manchuria] and others have
gone out to China and other countries to engage in various occupations. 3”
It is needless to say that our national development in the future will make
great strides.4
___________________________
3

TM [Teachers’ Manual] note: “Our people should further go abroad with great
ambitions.
4
TM list of important teaching points:
a. The Emperor’s way in the Restoration.
b. The nation followed the Will of the Imperial Charter Oath of Five Items, and
people both high and low contributed their efforts to bringing prosperity to
the nation.
c. The advancement in methods of government.
d. The strengthening of the military and the enhancement of national
prestige. [Italics and emphasis added.]
e. The development of diplomatic relations.
f. The increase in land and population, and the expansion overseas.
When teaching this chapter and the following, take special care not to teach the
chapters historically and thus defeat the very purpose of the lesson (Hall, 1949:84).

The above examples from the Shushin-sho clearly illustrate the state-controlled
“propaganda” that many researchers have mentioned. Meiron and Susie Harries’ view of
shushin is that it had a “near-obsessive stress on loyalty, filial piety, obedience and the
subordination of the individual will” which was replaced in 1946 with civics and social
studies stressing “reflective not customary morality, the ethical rather than the obedient
citizen.” Harries points out that school radio broadcasts featuring nationwide
coordinated calisthenics and such items as ‘Juvenile Stories from the Co-Prosperity
Sphere’ were also replaced in 1946 with an adolescent psychological series called ‘What
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Am I?’ to explore the “naturalness of curiosity, rebelliousness, and other intense
emotions” (Harries, 1978:64). Harries aversion to coordinated calisthenics is not well
explained, as these had been introduced to Japan by the French, English, and Americans
when the educational system was revised in 1873 (Kodansha, 1993:324-328).
However, the “democratization” of the Japanese education system in 1946, which
Harries heralds, does have its detractors, as many older Japanese are concerned by the
“lack of discipline, a refusal to conform, rampant consumerism and individual ambition –
which they attribute directly to the alien code of values imposed by the Americans in the
1940s” (Harries: 272). A former Imperial Army major, now 79 years old, echoes
Harries’ sentiment when he told me, “I am chagrined at today’s youth, who have no
manners or respect. They should be taught shushin in elementary school” (Funaya 1998).
(2) Shinto. Implicit with shushin was the teaching of State Shinto, the politicize—
vice religious—form of Shinto which should not be confused with Shrine Shinto. State
Shinto (hereafter called Shinto for simplicity) revolved around the deity of the Showa
emperor (reigned 1925-1989), Hirohito, and differed in emphasis (but not concept) from
the Meiji emperor’s “democratic god-emperor.”
Shinto was used by the militarists and those in power to unify the mind and
strengthen the loyalty of the Japanese people, and was eventually to become the bulwark
of the preservation and independence of the racial culture and the protection of the
country from foreign domination. During the Second World War, Shinto provided the
strong spiritual glue used to cement the people’s patriotism. It was during the 1940s that
Shinto acquired its pronounced nationalistic character (Ono, 1962:78-79).
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The emphasis on the deity of the Emperor had become so overpowering that by
1938 “the great majority of Japanese, both the intellectual and the common man,
sincerely believed in the benevolent omnipotence of the Imperial Line and in the unique
Japanese characteristic of a government by rulers physically descended from the
Gods….If it had once been propaganda, the Japanese themselves had been duped by their
own propaganda” (Hall, 1949:51).
(3) Yamato Damashii. The nationalistic flavoring added to Shinto during the
1930s and 40s also incorporated the concept of Yamato Damashii, “the peculiar
endowment of the Japanese people resulting from their genealogical succession from the
Gods” (Hall, 1949:57). Yamato Damashii (Soul of Japan) is more clearly “a phrase used
to describe spiritual qualities supposedly unique to the Japanese people. These range
from physical and moral fortitude and courage, sincerity, and devotion” to the national
spirit, and was equated to unquestioning loyalty to emperor and nation (Kodansha
1993:1736-7).
(4) Nihon Seishin. Yamato Damashii is directly related to Nihon Seishin, the
Japanese spirit “synonymous with Emperor worship,” fusing “the Confucian veneration
for ancestors with the Shinto belief in the divine origin of the Japanese Emperors” (Hall,
1949:57). As Yamato Damashii was directly related to Nihon Seishin, so were they both
combined in a synergetic synthesis using Seishin Tanren as the catalyst. Seishin Tanren
literally means “spiritual forging” and is implemented through severe, austere training.
The aforementioned “coordinated calisthenics” was one method of building the group
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solidarity which is so elemental to Japanese society; however, the exercises are not
enough to be considered “forging.”
h. Budo: the Linchpin of Shinto, Yamato Damashii, and Seishin Tanren.
The Seishin Tanren method most often implemented was through the budo. School
children were heated, hammered, and annealed repeatedly through the daily practice of
budo which by this time was a compulsory course taught throughout the public school
system in the forms of kendo and judo for boys, and naginata for girls. In addition to the
public school courses which exemplified Yamato Damashii, private budo dojo were used
to propagate the ultra-nationalistic and militaristic mores of the Japan of the 1930s and
40s. Ultra-nationalistic ties to private dojo were established well before the 1930s and it
is documented that many of the small revolutionist movements prior to the Meiji
Restoration of 1868 were headquartered in private fencing halls such as the Rempeikan,
headed by Yamaoka Tesshu (Stevens 1984).
Since the late Edo period (circa 1840) fencing training had become an activity for
commoners, thanks in part to the incorporation of the safe split bamboo “foil.” The
commoner trend had grown to such extent that numerous ryu-ha were founded by and for
non-warrior classes, which allegedly was approved by the authorities. Seemingly, the
feudal government viewed the rise of a sport-like form of fencing as a useful way do
dissipate energy; however, they erred in that the “kendo dojo of the later half of the 19th
century became centers of political discontent. It is a fact that many of the lower level
samurai who engineered the Meiji Restoration of 1868 formulated some of their attitudes
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and ideas in the dojo which incorporated bamboo swords (Bieri, 1984:3). Laszlo Abel
provides us with a brief sketch of the machi dojo (town dojo, i.e., private dojo):
During the revolutionary ferment of the 1850’s and 1860’s, the
machi dojo served as meeting places for large groups of disgruntled lower
ranking samurai and others. There, opinions could be aired and strategies
planned without the threat of detection by the authorities. The machi dojo
instilled virtues like fortitude and determination. Also important, they
attracted people from many areas of Japan and brought them together for a
common purpose. Friendships and the feeling of sharing a common plight
fostered a sense of nationhood, a view of Japan as a single state, that had
been lacking when primary loyalties were to family of fief. In time, they
proved to be the best arenas available in which to train the younger
generation samurai and commoner. Many of them relied on lessons
learned in the machi dojo as they guided Japan through the turmoil of the
Meiji Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion and on into the twentieth
century (Abel, 1984b:14-15).
i. Recipe for educational reforms: a delay along the martial way.
Educational doctrine, militarism, thought control, shushin, Shinto, Yamato
Damashii, Nihon seishin, seishin tannin, and budo. These nine elements were in toto the
component parts comprising Japan’s education system, and ultimately the reason for the
Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) dissolution of the entire education system in
1945. The preceding nine parts share equal responsibility for disseminating ultranationalism and sustaining Japan’s expansionism; a recipe for war. However, if we look
at the above items as salad vegetables and a bowl, the first eight items would be the
recipe ingredients, whereas budo would be the salad bowl. We may consider budo the
salad bowl as it was the vessel by which ultra-nationalistic nutrition was conveyed to the
“body Japan.”
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I address Budo as the vehicle used to express the wartime Japanese spirit.
However, it is more precise to say that kendo—the senior art of the traditional budo
hierarchy—was the vehicle of choice by the authorities. Kendo is symbolic of the
attitude which authorities of the day desired, and is manifest in the Japanese sword,
holding for the Japanese the embodiment of their national entity. The sword is one of the
three Imperial Regalia comprising Japan’s national symbols of authority and legitimacy
of the emperor (Kodansha, 1993:596). Although the three Imperial Regalia symbolize
Shintoism, it is especially the sword that exudes the spirit of Japan and has had a spiritual
significance for the Japanese for more than twelve centuries (Kodansha, 1993:1491).
This very sword is said to contain the soul of the samurai and was his authority, mentor,
and spirit. Therefore, it was the sword and the sword arts that received more exposure in
the 1930s and 40s as a means of inculcating the “Japanese Spirit.”
j. The military sword.
From 1872 through the early 1930s the Japanese military used swords patterned
after the European model. In 1934 the pattern (Model 94) was changed to resemble the
tachi, an ancient style sword suspended from two hangers which is more commonly—yet
incorrectly—called a “samurai sword” (Fuller and Gregory, 1987: 26; Fuller and
Gregory, 1997: 54), and remained a part of the military uniform until 1945. According to
Robert Leurquin, “It was General Araki [Sadao] who…after the Manchurian campaign,
brought back to honor the famous Samurai saber, a terrific weapon which is wielded with
both hands and whose guard [i.e., handle] is almost half as long as the blade” (Thompson,
1942:28). “The big heavy swords carried by officers are not a mere badge of rank but are
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used skilfully [sic] whenever opportunity offers…. [T]he classic single-edged blades of
Japan’s feudal era will slice a handkerchief in mid-air, or part of a man’s body from
collar bone to waist in a single slash” (Scofield, 1942:24).
It was this “terrific weapon” that school children were being trained to eventually
wield; this sword that was to taint the shield of bushido with its sanguine use in Nanking
and other areas of operation; this sword which now exemplified an aggressive,
expansionist, and fanatic nation. The “soul of Japan” had for a time departed the
corporal body and was now replaced with a sullied “doppleganger,” or evil-twin.
“During the wars of the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa eras the Katsujin-ken had been thrown
away and the Satsujin-ken taken up” (Nakamura, 1995:37). In Japanese swordsmanship
there are two philosophies of using the sword. Katsujin-ken is literally the “Life-giving
Sword” and embodies all that is righteous: protecting the weak, destroying evil, and
cultivating one’s own spirit. Conversely, Satsujin-ken is the “Murdering Sword” which
takes the lives of the weak, propagates evil, and eventually destroys one’s humanity
(Dann 1978, Nakamura 1973, Warner and Draeger 1982). As Nakamura points out from
his first hand experience as a swordsmanship instructor to the Japanese Army from 1932
through 1945, Tanaka’s “corruption of bushido” was revealed by the satsujin-ken.
6. CHAPTER 2 CONCLUSION.
Japan has a long martial tradition beginning from the eighth century and ending in
1945 with Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Throughout this period, various
schools of budo were established to convey skill in weaponry to the bushi caste. These
various schools, called ryu-ha, once taught complete systems of warriorship called “sogo
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budo,” or comprehensive martial arts; however, beginning in the seventeenth century the
ryu-ha became increasingly specialized, usually in one or two arts. Thus, schools
specializing only in fencing, unarmed grappling, archery, naginata, scythe-and-chain, and
other arts became standard.
The nineteenth century saw the socialization of martial arts extend to include not
only the warrior caste, but commoners as well. Socialization was responsible for the
mass dissemination of the martial arts and culminated at the end of the century into a
nationalized, standardized, control overseen by a semi-governmental organization called
the Dai Nippon Butokukai. The Butokukai desired to extend the benefits of martial arts
to all Japanese and was responsible for kendo and judo finally being added to public
school curricula in 1912. As the country went to war in the 1930s the Butokukai became
increasingly politicized and became a fountainhead of official governmental propaganda
by stressing ultra-nationalism, militarism, and a martial spirit. The Butokukai’s direction
became more oriented toward preparing Japan’s youth and men for combat training by
emphasizing a battlefield goal approach to martial arts instead of the traditional goals of
cultivating the spirit. Additionally, the Butokukai incorporated the modern disciplines of
bayonet fencing, grenade throwing, and rifle marksmanship. Illustrations 4 and 5 depict
the global budo relationship before and after World War II.
The educational system was also responsible for indoctrinating Japan’s youth with
ultra-nationalistic brainwashing, and reinforcing that propaganda through compulsory
classes in the martial arts that emphasized the Yamato Damashii, Japanese Spirit.
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The Monbusho was a willing participant of the war effort and their molding school
children into soldiers was insidious, subtle, and severe. For these ultra-nationalistic and
militaristic reasons, SCAP closed the school system in 1945 and oversaw its complete
overhaul along American lines.
The dissolution of the old educational system impacted budo in that kendo, judo,
and naginata training would eventually be prohibited by the reformed Monbusho at the
direction of GHQ, MacArthur’s General Headquarters (Futaki et al., 1994:208-209).
Doubtless, Japan’s military battlefield manner and over exuberant use of the “murdering
sword,” as well as the strong propaganda value of the budo were major contributors to
this decision.
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JAPANESE CIVIL-MILITARY MARTIAL ARTS RELATIONSHIP
1895 ~ 1945
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1932
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1925
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Espionage
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Martial Arts Ban 1945~1947
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Aikido
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Federation
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Karate
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Federation
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Taizaburo

International
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Federation
ca 1980
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Direct Control
Direct Control

Illustration 4
Japan’s Global Budo Map, 1895-1998
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Teaches both
Toyama Ryu Iaido
and
Nakamura Ryu
Battodo

POST-WAR MARTIAL ARTS
DEVELOPMENT

Dai Nippon
Butokukai

Rikugun Toyama
Gakko

Martial Arts Ban 1945~1947

All Japan
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Federation
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All Japan
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Federation
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1950
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Battodo
1953
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Kendo

Aikido
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Karate
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Federation
1977
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Japanese Budo

Nakamura Taizaburo

Teaches both
Toyama Ryu Iaido
and
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Battodo
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Federation
ca 1980

Jodo
(Staff)

Nakamura Taizaburo
Influence
Direct Control
Coordination
Sources: Taizaburo Nakamura, Iai-Kendo. (Tokyo: Seitosha, 1973); Taizaburo Nakamua, Katsujinken Battodo . (Tokyo:
Seibunsha, 1995); Nihon Budokan, "The Budo Monthly." (Tokyo: Beisubaru Magajin, 1991).

Illustration 5
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Japanese Budo Post-Occupation, A Partial Depiction
CHAPTER 3. THE AMERICAN SIDE
1. Historical background.
The United States of America declared war on Japan after Japan’s attack on the US
Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941. Simultaneously, Great
Britain entered the war against Japan after being attacked in Singapore in what was a
Japanese coordinated attack against the enemies of Nazi Germany.
Japan’s initial success soon turned into a protracted war of attrition in the Pacific
Ocean and upon the Asian continent. Bogged down in China since 1937 after
overextending its lines of communication and supply, Japan soon was to feel the gnawing
of logistical hunger throughout its areas of operation. Consequently, against superior
firepower and logistic support, Japan capitulated on 15 August 1945 and signed the
instruments of unconditional surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor on 2
September 1945.
2. Occupation of Japan.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was designated by President Harry S.
Truman as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and ran the occupation
from Tokyo from what is known as General Headquarters, or GHQ. Receiving “civil
responsibility and absolute control over almost 80-million people and…maintain[ing]
that control until Japan had once more demonstrated that it was ready, willing, and able
to become a responsible member of the family of free nations,” MacArthur was placed in
charge of the democratization of Japan (MacArthur, 1964:321). The unilateral power of
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the Americans was repeatedly called into question by both the British and Soviets who
wanted to divide the Japanese pie as had been done in Berlin; however, MacArthur
refused a multilateral division because of the governing problems surfacing in Germany
(MacArthur, 1964:333). To this day the Soviets exhibit a strong disgruntlement, as is
evidenced in Zhukov’s book The Rise and Fall of the Gunbatsu: A Study in Military
History:
The cooling of chauvinistic passions among the people after the war and
the upswing of the working-class and democratic movements should, it
seemed, have closed the road to any revival of militarist practices.
However, the social roots of militarism were not removed. Japan proper
was occupied by US forces.
The actions of the American occupation authorities showed that US
policy was in fact oriented toward the preservation of militarism….
US imperialism began to regard Japan as a key instrument of its policy in
Asia. The US aggression against Korea was the first serious test in this
context….(Zhukov, 1975:9) [Emphasis added.]
Despite Zhukov’s insistence that Japan capitulated because of Russia’s declaration
of war on Japan (Zhukov 1975) three days prior to dropping the atomic bomb, the fact
remains that the US and Great Britain did the fighting and dying; the Soviet contribution
was at best, minimal in the Japanese theater. Therefore, without the inclusion of a
Russian presence the Occupation of Japan was underway in 1945. Under the command
of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,
American forces were encumbered with bringing the defeated Japan from a militaristic
society to a democratic one.
3. The “Budo Ban”: Fact or Fiction?
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Much has been written in the Japanese martial arts community about a SCAP ban
on martial arts. According to these writers, any reader would infer that the US authorities
placed an overall blanket-ban on budo or that a “laundry-list” of banned martial arts
existed. My review of the literature presents a different picture, leading me to
hypothesize that there was in fact no overall ban on the practice of martial arts.
However, the fact cannot be denied that a cessation of activities did occur…sporadically
at best. Therefore, was there really a ban or is this a popular myth?
Myths tend to become larger with each telling, and at this juncture in time the
popular belief is that martial arts were not practiced during a five-year period from 1945
through 1950, the time period of the occupation. This belief is so strong that it is
repeated with conviction and accepted without question; however, there are indications
budo were openly practiced during the period in question.
The purpose of this section of my paper is to question the “budo ban” myth. My
hypothesis is that there are three possibilities present: (1) a total ban; (2) a partial ban; (3)
or no ban. Accordingly, I shall begin with the policies which may have had the most
impact on budo.
a. Policy administration.
Chapter two presents how traditional budo, infused with militarism and ultranationalism was propagandized and disseminated throughout Japan in the 1930s and 40s.
Dissemination was enacted through three portals: (1) private semi-governmental
organizations such as the Butokukai; (2) boys’ military prep schools and military
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academies such as the Rikugun Toyama Gakko and the Shikan Gakko (army officer
academy); and (3), through the public school system.
Illustrations 6 depicts the connection between the Rikugun Toyama Academy, other
government schools, and the Butokukai.
As part of MacArthur’s mandate to transform Japan into a democratic society, he
undertook to first remove militarism from the culture. This task was partially
accomplished by instituting a purge against, and preventing from holding future office,
those public officials who were (1) connected in anyway with the military or war effort,
(2) exponents of militaristic nationalism, and (3) influential members of certain rightist
organizations (NARA 1946a). Additionally, the educational system was to be dissolved
and reformed along American lines (FEC 1947, Martin 1948).
The purge, demilitarization of the country, and reformation of the educational
system were placed into effect with four policy documents, all which in one way or
another became related to budo. The first of these documents is the Basic Initial PostSurrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation
and Control of Japan, 8 November 1945 which lays down the terms of the Potsdam
Declaration. The second document is Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Instruction to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN) 548 (4 January 1946) dealing with the
Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations.
The third document is SCAPIN 550 (4 January 1946), Removal and Exclusion of
Undesirable Personnel from Public Office; and lastly, the Far Eastern Commission Policy
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Decisions (27 March 1947 and 12 February 1948). These policy decisions are what I
hypothesize as the genesis of the “budo ban.”
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Sources: Rikugun Shikan Gakko Museum, "' Morote Gunto Jutsu' 3rd Degree Level Certificate Issued to Cadet Umeda." (Camp
Zama, Japan); Taizaburo Nakamura, Nihon To Tameshigiri no Shinzui. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1980); Rikugun Toyama
Gakko, Gunto no Sohou Oyobi Tameshigiri
. (Tokyo: Kokubo Budo Kyokai, 1939).

Illustration 6
Government Schools
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b. Genesis of the “budo ban.”
(1) Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, 8 November 1945. This document
tasks MacArthur to
assure
the
dissolution
of...all
Japanese
ultranationalistic...societies and their agencies and affiliates... provide for the
permanent dissolution of all military and para-military organizations...and
other militaristic associations which might serve to keep alive the military
tradition in Japan....All military and para-military training on land and
sea and in the
air will be prohibited....” and that “Japanese military and para-military
training and drill in all schools will be forbidden” (Martin, 1948:128133). [Emphasis added.]
Note that this policy addresses para-military training, not classical martial arts. It is
possible that “para-military” training could be over interpreted as “martial art,” thus
using this clause used to close down budo dojo and forbid their being taught in school.
But could we in all honesty consider fencing, wrestling, boxing, javelin, discus, hammer,
and archery as “para-military training?” These sports, analogous to Japanese budo, were
military arts in their day and are the foundation of the Olympic games, originally a
display of military skill. Nazi Germany taught these Olympic-type sports, plus fencing
and marksmanship, to its youth in schools and extra-curricular clubs; they, too, were used
as a platform to teach racial superiority. However, these sports were not banned during
Germany’s occupation even though the sports and teachers were as full of ultranationalistic propaganda as were their Japanese counterparts. What would be the
reaction of Americans if these Olympic sports were banned from American schools and
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universities on the basis they were “para-military training?” And let us include the
epitome of militarism: football; is not football military training and maneuvers?

(2) SCAPIN 548 proclaims:
You will prohibit the formation of any political party, association,
society or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them
or of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose
activity, is the following:…[para] f. Affording military or quasi-military
training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or
special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy,
or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan (NARA 1946a).
This clause, too, is subject to interpreting budo as “quasi-military” training, and in fact it
was used to dissolve the Dai Nippon Butokukai. SCAPIN 548 included a list of
organizations to be dissolved, but the Butokukai escaped mention. However, “the
Japanese Government was orally instructed to add the Dai Nippon Butokukai to the list
of organizations in appendix A of SCAPIN 548 and to dissolve the organization….” (US
Government, 1948:68-69).

(3) SCAPIN 550 quotes the Potsdam Declaration as it instructs:
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking
on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and
justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the
world.
SCAPIN 550 sought to exclude from public office those individuals who were
war criminals, career military members, special police, officials of the war ministries,
career civil service members, influential members of ultra-nationalistic patriotic societies,
other political groups, officers involved in Japanese expansions (i.e., Manchurian
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Development Company), governors of occupied territories, and additional militarists and
ultra-nationalists who were not previously mentioned—more than likely a catch-all to
cover anybody who did not come under the other categories.
Although SCAPIN 550 does not address budo, it was applied to former leaders of
the Dai Nippon Butokukai who were declared “purgeable” in that “…all influential
members of this association (Dai Nippon Butokukai)…will be treated as falling within
the provisions of category “G” (rather than “C”) appendix A, SCAPIN 550” (US
Government 1948).
(4) Far Eastern Commission Policy
The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was composed of representatives of the allied
powers and was headquartered in the former Japanese embassy in Washington DC. The
FEC wrote policies already outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and the Post-Surrender
Directive to SCAP such as, “All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and
aggression will be vigorously suppressed” (FEC,1947:51). FEC Policy Decision,
February 12, 1948: “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of
Japanese Military Equipment” is another example of making official acts already
accomplished. Appendix 1, Paragraph 10 of this document directs that “Reestablishment
of the following should be prohibited:…any military or para-military organizations,” and
paragraph 12 instructs “Military training of the civilian population and military
instruction in schools should be prohibited” (FEC 1949).
Of all Occupation policies, the only one directly attacking budo is FEC Policy
Decision, March 27, 1947: Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System.
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This educational reform policy was established to dismantle the propaganda machine
which the education system had become. In the policy, the FEC directs that “Classical
sports such as Kendo, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned.
Physical training should no longer be associated with the SEISHIN KYOIKU” (FEC,
1947:95). Seishin kyoiku is the spiritual forging which is derived from severe or austere
budo training.
MacArthur was not kind to the FEC. In MacArthur’s eyes “the Far Eastern
Commission [was] ineffective….they usually confined themselves to approving actions
which the occupation had already taken on its own initiative” (MacArthur, 1964:335).
Therefore, with the FEC’s policy against “classical sports such as Kendo” in mind, we
may infer that MacArthur had actually imposed a ban on the martial arts. However, that
being the case, the ban would have affected only the “classical sports” taught in the
public school system, not the entire budo community.
Harries, speaking to the effect of the SCAP and FEC policies on public schools,
provides an indication of how the policies were administered:
‘Military science halls’ [budo dojo] were to be converted into
gymnasia. Any suggestion of military drill was to be eradicated from the
bearing of students….Most revealing were the list of courses ordered
deleted from the curriculum….For elementary school pupils, between the
ages of five and eleven, judo, kendo, kyudo,…‘Warships’, ‘Play at
Soldiers’, ‘Fish Torpedoes’. For secondary pupils: aviation, halberd
practice [naginata], Navy March, “Strength of Iron (Kurogane No
Chikara) shout of triumph’ [kiai?], bayonet exercise, throwing hand
grenades (Harries: 64). [Emphasis added.]
Judo, kendo, and kyudo courses must have been eliminated for secondary pupils also, as
these arts were taught beyond the elementary level.
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c. Discussion.
Often, writers of history tend to pass on a “falsism” based on other writers’
research, expecting the information to be factual; this phenomenon occurs also within the
field of martial arts research and history . Donn Draeger was a highly respected
historian, researcher, and practitioner of budo, and is widely considered the most
informed researcher of Japanese budo in the English language. Not detracting from
Draeger’s mostly factual and scholarly contributions, he did make errors. For example,
in Draeger 1996c:46 he states “An unplanned clash between Japanese and Chinese troops
near Peking in 1937 spread and developed into general conflict.”
Draeger is citing the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Kodansha,1993:923), referred to
by the Library of Congress book, Japan—A Country Study as “an allegedly unplanned
clash” (LOC, 1994) [Emphasis added]. In opposing Draeger, I take into consideration
the Japanese machination of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 in which an attack by
Japanese forces against the Chinese was expertly planned by Japanese Army ultranationalists then stationed in China. In this event, similar in perspective to the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident, Japanese forces blew up a few meters of South Manchurian
Railway Company track (owned by Japan) and blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, providing
an excuse to seize the town of Mukden (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc, 1994).
Because of precedence and an unending desire to involve the country in a war with
China, we must conclude that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a minutely calculated
affair. Although a minor point, I am not over-reacting. Remember that many Western
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martial artists accept Draeger as the “gospel;” therefore, by showing his inexactitudes or
outright errors, we lay a foundation to further dispel his statements about the so-called
“budo ban.”
In the same book Draeger gives the false impression that Emilio Bruno was the
senior “Western” judo player of the day, calling Bruno “America’s senior Caucasian judo
exponent” (1996c:49). In actuality, America’s “true” senior exponent was Warren
Lewis, an African-American from Los Angeles who beat Tamura Masato in 1936 (Svinth
1997).
Minor inaccuracies aside, Draeger’s most quoted “falsism” is that the US
Occupation authorities banned all martial arts. Usually, this “falsism” is passed on and
expanded by other authors who do not investigate any further; the “falsism” then
becomes: “the post-war American occupation authorities under General Douglas
MacArthur banned judo, aikido, and kendo.” Here are Draeger’s actual quotes on the
martial arts ban:
Among the many measures taken by the Allied Powers to eliminate
Japan’s potential to wage war was a prohibition of all institutions
considered to be “the roots of militarism.” As a result, the Butokukai and
its affiliates were disbanded….(Draeger,1996c:48).
This first part of the quote is true. However, the following second part of the quote
contains misinformation which has been assumed by others to be true because Draeger
wrote it:
Included in the prohibition were classical bujutsu and budo, as well as
the modern disciplines. But the Allied Powers were unable to identify
precisely the component systems of the modern disciplines, and one such
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discipline – karate-do – escaped detection and continued to be openly
practiced (Draeger,1996c:48) [emphasis added].
As we have seen in the actual policy statements, there were no prohibitions against
“classical bujutsu and budo;” there were prohibitions against “para-military and quasimilitary training.” Although Draeger attempts to convey the spirit and the actual
enforcement of the policy, he unwittingly creates a new myth: the Allied Powers
prohibited all budo. Draeger would have done greater service had he stated that the
policies were over interpreted and applied to the martial arts in addition to the targeted
“military combat” training which was being instructed to civilians and school children.
d. Purge.
The purge was enacted against all ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations;
however, for the sake of this paper we will address only the Butokukai. I believe that it is
due to the purge and dissolution of this “Martial Virtue Society” that there is the
perception that all budo were proscribed between 1945-1950.
Prior to the Butokukai’s disestablishment it was the senior authority on budo
practiced in Japan. The organization was staffed by people from all walks of life with the
common interest of preserving the martial arts who believed the budo held values and
morals which could not manifest from other types of training. Additionally, preserving
the budo assured the continuance of tradition; ergo, Japan. Amongst the staff, there were
those who were and were not ultra-nationalists. However, at the assumption of command
by the Allies from 1945, all members of the Butokukai were to be banned from public
office. The nuance here is similarly applied to Germany: it was impossible not to find a
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member of the National Socialist Party amongst post-war occupation public
administrators—they were all Nazis; that is, they all belonged to the party whether or not
they agreed with its platform. The membership of the Butokukai was similarly
composed: some were ultra-nationalists, some were not. Be that as it may, the purge was
enacted and prevented many capable administrators from obtaining posts in the post-war
Japanese administration.
One such case is that of former justice minister Tokutaro Kimura, who had been
barred from obtaining his former position. After being turned down, Kimura obtained the
support of the Japanese Prime Minister who wrote a letter to MacArthur. MacArthur
responded by refusing Kimura because he held the office of National Director of Dai
Nippon Butokukai (MacArthur 1948). Later, Kimura was approved because MacArthur
had been convinced that:
Kimura…was not a rightist, but had been merely head of the
financing division of Butokukai, a position offered to him ‘because of his
preeminence as a citizen and his hobbies of fencing and sword collection
which of course have nothing to do with militarism and aggression.’ This
time it worked, SCAP’s reverse course had begun and thousands of
rightists were being depurged. On October 13, 1950, Kimura was
reinstated and became once again justice minister” (Kaplan and Dubro,
1987:89).
However, Kimura was in fact a rightist and ultra-nationalist who worked to organize
yakuza support for the government against communism (Kaplan and Dubro 1987).
Due to MacArthur’s “soft approach” in exercising SCAP directives, many former
ultra-national public officials were not purged as they should have been according to
SCAPIN 550, earning MacArthur the scorn of some chroniclers as “being indulgent to
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the Japanese militarists and war criminals” (Zhukov, 1975:196). Of course, not
everybody considered most Japanese as war criminals, however, there were still the
militarists with which to contend. Kaplan and Dubro appear not to agree with
MacArthur’s “SCAP policy that let Kodama and other prewar ultra-nationalists back out
on the streets and into the elective offices and the corporate boardrooms” (Kaplan and
Dubro, 1987:89).
Apparently, MacArthur shared the same reasoning as General George S. Patton,
who was crucified by the media for using so many former Nazis during the US
occupation of post-war Germany. MacArthur writes:
The Potsdam declaration also contained a purge provision requiring
all Japanese who had actively engaged in war to be removed from public
office and excluded from political influence. I very much doubted the
wisdom of this measure, as it tended to lose the services of many able
governmental individuals who would be difficult to replace in the
organization of a new Japan. I put the purge into operation with as little
harshness as possible….As soon as the peace treaty restored Japan’s full
sovereignty, all prohibitions against the purgees were promptly, and
properly, removed (MacArthur, 1964:341-2).
e. Budo during the ban.
(1) Karate.
Controversy abounds in reference to karate and the ban. Some researchers
conclude that it was banned outright, others say it was banned but received a reprieve.
Still, others state that karate was banned but practiced in the form of a dance when
occupation troops came around. Let us review the available literature on karate and see if
fact can be separated from myth.
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According to Draeger, “Allied Powers were unable to identify precisely the
component systems of the modern disciplines, and one such discipline – karate-do –
escaped detection and continued to be openly practiced” (1996c:48). It is unclear how
karate could escape detection since it was formally accepted into the Butokukai in 1935
(Higaonna 1995, Yamazaki 1997), and the Butokukai maintained lists and records of the
martial arts broken down by discipline, ranks, and numbers within the ranks.
Howard Reid and Michael Croucher contend that an American commission
“concluded that the national martial arts systems had played an important role in the
development of nationalistic and militaristic attitudes. Consequently, for a time, the
practice of all martial arts except, strangely enough, karate, was banned” (1983:196).
Another author passes on the same information about a ban on karate stating that “the
U.S. Occupation authorities had banned the practice of all martial arts (with the exception
of karate)” (Stevens, 1987:51). None of the authors provide a source for his statement,
but as noted earlier in this paper Draeger initially established that idea in 1974. Karate
appears to have been unaffected by the budo black-out.
Was karate actually banned? This question is answered by Masatoshi Nakayama,
former head of the Japan Karate Association, as he explains karate avoided the ban
because:
the edict of the GHQ (General headquarters of Allied Powers) was
worded in such a way that it included karate as a part of judo. I had a
friend who knew the head of the Education Bureau at the Ministry of
Education, and he helped us convince the allied powers that karate was
not part of judo at all. Using the premise that karate was actually a form
of Chinese boxing—a sport—we received permission to practice. The
GHQ thought karate was just a harmless pastime! So, while the other
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martial arts had to wait until the ban was lifted in 1948, we were able to
practice and progress” (Hassell, 1983:47).
Nakayama’s statement is convenient, however, his memory may have been
influenced by time and the retelling of a myth. Judo and karate were not in the verbiage
of the policy documents, therefore, it is difficult to explain how karate could become
confused with judo; with the exception that they both wore white uniforms. However, as
pointed out earlier, the policies were apparently subject to broad interpretation as to what
constituted “para-military training.”
Other karate experts believe that karate was such an unknown budo at the time that
it escaped because GHQ simply did not recognized it as a martial art (Iguchi 1998). A
Japan-wide ban on budo was in fact enacted upon the public schools by the Monbusho at
the urging [read: “orders”] of GHQ as part of the educational reform (Futaki et al.,
1994:209). If karate were part of the official educational curriculum it could have been
mixed in with the “ban;” however, karate in Japan was only being taught in universities
as extra-curricular activities and had no formal support from the government. Because
karate was not part of the Japanese Monbusho curriculum it naturally was not included in
the ban (Iguchi 1998). However, to-de (the original reading of “kara-te,” the Chinese
characters meaning Chinese Fist) was being taught in Okinawan schools as early as 1905
(Higaonna, 1995:21), and in April 1933 it had become recognized within the educational
curriculum of Okinawa (Higaonna, 1995:70). Since karate was recognized by the
Butokukai in 1935 (Higaonna, 1995:70; Yamazaki, 1997:35) and was entered into the list
of “official budo,” it is possible that American occupation forces could have confused
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karate with judo practice, at least in Okinawa, and that it may have been included in the
Monbusho decree.
George Van Horn, a Chito Ryu karate sensei, stated that Chitose sensei related to
him that “[Chitose] and his peers would in fact get together and train, but when the
Occupation military police happened by, their kata would suddenly became [sic] an
Okinawan “dance.” In this manner, they could train without being caught violating the
law, since Okinawan dance and kata have many similarities” (Colling, 1996:35).
Unfortunately Van Horn does not relate to Colling when, during the occupation, this
episode allegedly happened.
Enough information is presented to support the hypothesis that the “ban” may have
been, in the case of karate, enacted on a regional case-by-case basis: that while allowed
in Japan, karate was still proscribed in its country of origin: Okinawa.
(2) Kyudo.
Mr. David Chambers intimated to me that in 1970 he was returning from
Kamakura’s Hachiman Shrine with Onuma Hideharu sensei when the subject of the
‘budo ban’ came up. Onuma sensei was the 15th headmaster of Heiki Ryu archery, a
Japanese archery master (hanshi), and an Olympic archery coach. Onuma sensei told
Chambers, “Kyudo was banned; however, I was able to have an audience with General
MacArthur and I explained that kyudo is little different than Western archery—not a
‘martial art.’ The next day I was able to open my dojo again” (Chambers 1998).
“In 1946-47 SCAP…had a command performance to see if they would allow
horseriding archery again, after it was banned for being part of state Shinto, which was
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felt to have been a detrimental influence on prewar Japan” (Muromoto, 1997:61).
Unfortunately, Muromoto does not relay the SCAP decision. It is probable that Onuma
was part of the performance because of his exalted position within the Japanese archery
world and was highly respected as a dismounted archer and yabusame archer (Onuma
and DeProspero, 1993).
(3) Judo.
Almost all references to the “budo ban” include judo as a subject of restriction, as
in this classic Draeger quote, “The prohibition against carrying on martial arts and ways
declared by SCAP in 1945 included judo and resulted in its technical stagnation….[J]udo
was finally reinstated in 1947” (Draeger, 1996c:123). Harrison, the noted jujutsu and
judo practitioner from the early part of the twentieth century, follows along Draeger’s
line and tells us that:
“Following the surrender of Japan and the assumption of virtually
autocratic powers by General MacArthur, a ban was imposed upon the
practice of judo. Later this shortsighted measure was relaxed but judo
teaching was restricted to the Kodokan whose premises, as already stated,
had amazingly escaped the almost wholesale devastation inflicted on the
capital by Allied air attack” (Harrison, 1958:83).
It is possible that Harrison at that time may have been operating out of a vacuum, and
relied on information brought back from Japan. At the time of writing he had not been in
Japan for over a score of years. Harrison does not give the date when practice was again
allowed and may, in fact been confusing the educational system ban with an “all out”
ban.
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Another view establishing that budo was not banned outright was written by the
noted Buddhist scholar and author Christmas Humphries, who was attending the Tokyo
War Trials as a news correspondent. He documents that after his arrival in Japan on 3
February 1946, judo was being publicly displayed in front of a group of American
servicemen.
I attended a great display of Judo in Tokyo….It was quite terrific,
and I was deeply moved by the tremendous spiritual force
displayed….(O)ne of the girl pupils persisting in her attempt at a tummy
throw until she got it. Imagine the cheers from about 2,000 American
G.I.s!…I also attended a special display of Kendo with my Japanese
friend, Mr. Tateno…For the moment, Kendo is barred from the schools as
a “military art.” May it soon return for, like English boxing, it lets off
steam in vigorous youngsters and teaches control in muscle, temper and
mind” (Humphries, 1948:44).
Because Humphries was actually on the ground soon after Japan’s surrender, his
statement must be given stronger consideration than that of Harrison’s.
Stronger yet is Walter E. Todd (judo 7th dan), who puts this particular part of the
myth to bed for good. He tells us, “I was sent to Japan. I arrived the autumn of
1945....Abe sensei...registered me at the Kodokan. In a minute, he had me in the dojo,
starting my initial lesson in judo. This was close to the end of 1945 or the start of 1946”
(Heard and Davey, 1997:32). Todd’s statement conclusively indicates that judo was not
proscribed in the private dojo, outside of the public schools.
Apparently the British military in post-war Singapore did not have the same
reservations against “para-military training” as did the Americans and allowed their
Japanese prisoners of war to practice judo and sumo. Jack Dallaway wrote from
Singapore, “One Sunday I obtained permission to visit a Japanese P.O.W. camp hoping
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to see a good display of Judo. Unfortunately, Judo was not practised at all, owing to the
difficulty of obtaining jackets and mats. ‘Sumo’ proved to be very popular” (London
Budokwai, 1947:3).
(4) Aiki-jujutsu.
Aiki-jujutsu, an earlier form of the softened aikido, was not taught in public school,
yet it appears to have been repressed—to a certain degree. Therefore, because of the
impact on aiki-jutsu we may infer that other kobudo [ancient martial school traditions]
could have been likewise affected. Another source confirming that budo were being
taught during the alleged ban eminate from Hugh Davey, whose father Victor H.
Davey—a jujutsu practitioner since 1925—studied aiki-jujutsu in Japan during the
occupation:
Due to the efforts of Captain [Victor H.] Davey, the Saigo family’s
standard of living was raised considerably. Perhaps out of gratitude, or as
a way of avoiding the occupying force’s ban on the practice of
bujutsu/budo, Saigo Kenji agreed to teach Davey Saigo Ryu [aikijujutsu].
(Logically, Captain Davey would have taken steps to allow Saigo to
continue to teach quietly, on a limited basis, despite the fact that the
practice of Japan’s martial arts and ways had generally been banned)
(Davey,1997:58).
(5) Kendo.
“Classical sports such as Kendo, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned.
Physical training should no longer be associated with the SEISHIN KYOIKU” (FEC, 1947:95).

Thus, kendo—the senior Japanese budo—seems to have taken the full brunt of the
so-called ban because of the patriotic fervor applied to it, and eminating from it. The
initial prohibition policy apparently affected kendo and other budo (under the moniker
“para-military training”) only within the public school system. Nonetheless, the ban
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evidently overflowed from the public schools into the private dojo; again, possibly
because of an over interpretation of of the “para-military” clauses in the former cited
SCAP policies. Extrapolotating from MacArthur’s earlier observation that the FEC only
approved actions which he had already taken (MacArthur, 1964:335), we should give
careful consideration to the probability that MacArthur had already singled out kendo for
removal from the public school curriculum.
Other researchers have recorded their assessments of the prohibition against
practicing kendo and other budo. Minoru Kiyota explains in his book Kendo, that
“[a]fter occupying the defeated nation, General Douglas MacArthur… outlawed
kendo…on the grounds that [it] had contributed to nationalism and militarism” (Kiyota
1997). Another author tells the reader that “[a]lso prohibited for a time were the martial
arts; kendo sword-training and judo clubs were closed down.” (Horsley and Buckley,
1990:20).
There can be no doubt that kendo was prohibited. However, I again assert that the
prohibition was directed against kendo being taught in the public school system. If there
was a “total shut-down” of kendo it must have derived from an overreaction to the
Ministry of Education’s policy (under direction of SCAP) banning budo training is
school.
In actuality, kendo was being openly taught although occupation forces were going
to various ex-military dojo (and assumably school dojo) to systematically destroy the
training equipment (Hazard 1998).
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The overall implication of historical data categorically states kendo was banned
during the occupation. However, that is not an accurate account. Why, then, do we not
read of kendo being taught during the ban? Again, Draeger provided the initial confusion
and misinformation upon this subject. He tells us that:
…in 1947 the Allied Powers authorized the retention of several classical
bujutsu…as methods of self-defense necessary in the training of Japanese
policemen within the greatly decentralized police force. In the following
year kendo and judo were also reinstated as desirable training disciplines
for the members of the skeleton law-enforcement agency; and, given a
sport emphasis, these same modern disciplines were also made available
to the general public.” (Draeger, 1996c:48). [Emphasis added.]
This paragraph is completely incorrect. In the first sentence Draeger states that
bujutsu was retained for police use in 1947, implying incorrectly that Japanese police
were not practicing kendo prior to 1947. The police were actively and openly training in
kendo from 1945 (Hazard 1998). 1947 was the year kendo was allowed to be openly
taught (Hazard 1998; Nakamura, 1995:276), not 1948 as Draeger concludes.
Supporting the mistaken view that “kendo was retained for the police in 1947,”
J. Svinth relays I.I. Morris’ opinion that “SCAP allowed kendo training to resume
because it wanted strikebreakers trained in the use of sticks” (Svinth 1998). The mention
of strikebreakers probably refers to the May Day strike in 1949 and if so, Morris’ theory
seems to go in tandem with Draeger’s. Both assert that kendo was banned until its use
was required for police activity.
However, Benjamin Hazard, Ph.D. (kendo kyoshi, 7th dan) states that both Draeger
and Svinth (ergo, Morris) are wrong. The Japanese police openly trained in kendo from
1945 with SCAP’s tacit approval. Hazard, then a Military Intelligence lieutenant and
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Japanese language specialist, trained with the Tsukiji Police during the time Draeger et al
imply the police were not training in kendo. For a short time in 1948 the police were
affected by the kendo moratorium; however, Hazard and his senior teacher would meet
privately for lessons. During the first lesson there were only the two; thereafter,
participation slowly increased to four, then six, then eight people—until once again there
was full-blown kendo training going on. The fact that Hazard was a POW interrogator
and member of the military intelligence community provided a legitimacy to the ongoing
kendo training and his participation was not questioned by SCAP authorities; however,
Hazard always felt that he would eventually be called upon the carpet for instigating the
continuance of kendo (Hazard 1998).
According to Hazard, Communist strikers on 1 May 1949 disarmed Japanese police
who were using 4 foot staffs for crowd control. The US Provost Marshal (PMO), not
knowing the difference between keijo [police staff] and kendo, attributed the Japanese
police force’s crowd control inadequacy to their training in kendo. Blaming kendo as the
problem, the PMO prohibited the police from training in kendo and arranged for New
York City police trainers to teach Japanese police the use of the night stick. Because
Hazard was training in kendo with the Tsukiji Police, he was also required to attend night
stick training (Hazard 1998).
Another piece of misinformation comes again from Draeger, stating “[w]ith the
Korean War, the ban on both classical and modern disciplines was officially removed….”
(Draeger, 1996c:49). Rosenberg also incorrectly paints the picture that “…with the
intensification of the Cold War, the approaching “fall” of China and war in Korea, and
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the emergence of Japan as a new ally, MacArthur dropped the martial arts ban”
(Rosenberg, 1995:19-20).
As we have seen in previous paragraphs, kendo (ergo, other budo) was allowed to
be publically taught in 1947 with the distinction of “not being kendo.” Its new name
became shinai kyogi [bamboo-sword competition] and the emphasis shifted from budo to
pure sport. “...[S]ome evidence exists to suggest that many martial systems were
influenced by the American presence. Kendo re-emerged in the 1950s in an even more
rule-bound and competitive form than it had been before 1945....” (Reid and Croucher,
1983:196).
An article in the Japan Martial Arts Society journal provides a filler to Reid and
Croucher’s mention of the “sportification” of kendo:
After the defeat, kendo and the other budo were suppressed by the
Occupation but this negative attitude slowly changed as more of the
Occupation troops became interested in them. In an attempt to placate
Western tastes, some kendo teachers devised a form of shinai [bamboo
training sword] training that somewhat resembled fencing. The traditional
training uniform (keiko-gi) were replaced and kiai [combative shouts]
vocalizations were suppressed. This so-called “shinai-kyogi” (bamboosword competition) was supposed to encourage individualism and
“democratic values” and continued to be practiced for sometime. With the
end of the foreign occupation, local dojo again opened and true kendo
gradually regained to its former popularity….The mainstay of support for
the art of kendo today is the public school system and the Ministry of
Education, whose emphasis is to promote it as a sport. Meanwhile, the
police department and local private dojo continue to be active centers of a
more traditional budo attitude of physical and spiritual training” (JMAS,
1984:6).
It was only after the Treaty of San Francisco (1951), returning administrative
control to Japan, less Okinawa, that the budo were once again included in the public
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school curriculum (Iguchi 1998). This was the renaissance of the true budo, now
authorized to be taught in school.
With the end of the foreign occupation, local dojo again opened
and true kendo gradually regained to its former popularity….The mainstay
of support for the art of kendo today is the public school system and the
Ministry of Education, whose emphasis is to promote it as a sport.
Meanwhile, the police department and local private dojo continue to be
active centers of a more traditional budo attitude of physical and spiritual
training” (JMAS, 1984:6).
Enough evidence is presented that indicates the “budo ban” was only enforced
periodically or by geographic location.
f. Alternative reason for the ban?
Could there be an alternative reason for the “budo ban” other than trying to make
Japan safe for democracy? It has been suggested that the ban against budo was enacted
to protect the repatriated Japanese soldiers from their brethren (Foeller 1998), so let us
explore the possibility.
It is true that the Japanese placed great hope and store in their military leaders until
their defeat in 1945, but how was the populace’s reaction after the war? MacArthur says
that “[i]dolatry for their feudalistic masters and the warrior class was transformed into
hatred and contempt…” (MacArthur, 1964:355). We can assume that the Japanese were
disappointed, and they did hate and hold in contempt the Imperial military man, but
would they go to extremes in segregating for abuse those battle-hardened men? Tom
Foeller and John Allison seem to think so. Foeller, in his correspondence to me on 13
January 1998, states that Allison, now a retired army general, was “the de facto Chief
Financial Officer of Japan” during the occupation.
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Relaying my question to Allison about the “budo ban,” Allison states the “budo
ban” was implemented for the good of the repatriated Japanese soldiers who were treated
with more disdain by their countrymen than were our post-Vietnam soldiers.
As the returning soldiers and sailors returned to their homeland, they
were totally disarmed by the occupying troops, right along with the
civilian populace. That, however, did not protect the returning military
from their hostile civilian brother and sisters who, using various martial
art-forms…did damage whenever and wherever they could….John Allison
then did the only sensible thing that he could do; he issued an edict via
military channels that no practice of simulated swordplay or any other
martial arts were to be permitted by anyone, even in a dojo (Foeller 1998).
Allison doubts that there were any old military or Japanese records dealing directly
with the history and enforcement of the martial art prohibition. He adds that many such
events and policies were deliberately not memorialized in official documents as, in
keeping with Japanese wishes, the shame of the general population striking out at the
returning military was not something the Emperor wanted written into the history books
(Foeller 1998).
As interesting a tangent as this explanation is, it must be held in further abeyance
until more research brings data to light. Therefore, although I do not discount Allen’s
views, I feel that the available evidence supports the concept that budo were banned in an
attempt to demilitarize the Japanese.
A corollary thought is that the combination of the martial arts ban, plus the post-war
hatred of the military has engendered the current Japanese disdain for the military, to
include their Self-Defense Force (except, of course when the SDF is saving the public
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from earthquake and typhoon damage). Of course, further research along this tangent
would benefit social anthropologists, and should be undertaken.
4. CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSION.
A great dichotomy appears to exist in whether or not there was a ban. One side of
the divide indicates there was no ban on martial arts, only on “para-military” or “quasimilitary” training. The other side of the schism forces the reader to go beyond intent and
look at the actual effect; that is, a moritorium on the practice of budo did occur. This
issue is further compounded by levels of disagreement upon the moritorium. In this
chapter both Dr. Hazard and Mr. Todd proclaim that classical martial ways were being
taught during the “ban” in open sessions. Mr. Davey gives evidence that bujutsu training
occured in secret, “allow[ing] Saigo to continue to teach quietly, on a limited basis,
despite the fact that the practice of Japan’s martial arts and ways had generally been
banned” (Davey,1997:58).
Yet another view, again provided by Davey, states that there was a total blackout on
the martial arts; whereas a dissenting opinion asserts that the proscription affected only
the public school system:
My father told me that all budo/bujutsu activities were banned—
everywhere—period…Todd sensei, on the other hand, insists that budo
was only banned in the schools...not private dojo. Sato Shizuya Sensei
seems to agree with my dad, but adds that it was possible to get around the
ban. (Obviously...since my dad was practicing aiki-jujutsu with Saigo
Sensei, as well as teaching his own judo classes to US military guys, and
all this took place during the SCAP ban.)” (Davey, 1997).
Overall, sufficient evidence is presented to proclaim without reservation that there
was a de facto, if not de jure, proscription on martial arts. However the so called “budo
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ban” did not affect the authorized teaching of kendo and judo outside of the public school
system. Apparently the ban did not have much of an effect on practicing other martial
arts, although they were taught in a surreptitious fashion.
Also, one must point out that whereas kendo and judo were being taught publicly,
they were removed from the public school system. While the proscription may have
overflowed to the other budo, martial arts were in abeyance only until 1947 when kendo
was allowed to be taught outside the police dojo.
Overall, the intent to expurge the teaching of bushido and seishin tanren from
Japanese society was ineffective as there was no lasting impact as a result of the two
years abeyance. Conversely, I ascertain that the “budo ban” was a boon to the post-war
growth and internationalization of Japanese budo; that this growth was husbanded by the
serious martial artists who believed in the purity of budo; and that this growth and
internationalization of budo was the direct result of US servicemen who developed an
interest in budo during the occupation years.
Further Research
Although I have gathered sources from many different facets of history to reach my
conclusion, I realize that gaps my research are present. In order to maintain objectivity, I
actively seek the assistance of others to clarify or expand upon my research. A quest for
further clarification to what is presented in this paper is solicited so that a fuller
understanding of the actual ban on martial arts may be provided. While I have been
unable to locate any policy in Japanese or English that expressly forbids classical
bujutsu, budo, or the modern budo, that is not to say these policies do not exist.
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